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MESSING WITH MOTHER NATURE: 
THE QUAGMIRE OF WETLAND 
MITIGATION BANKING 
By Theodore J. Griswold* 
Since the 1970s, federal, state, and local agencies have developed miti-gation policies requiring developers, 
including public works facilities, to com-
pensate for unavoidable damage to wet-
lands and other sensitive environmental 
habitats. Simply put, in exchange for per-
mission to adversely affect the environ-
ment, the developer must promise to re-
store or enhance similar resources, either 
in the same area or elsewhere. Unfortu-
nately, these promises have often been 
inadequately fulfilled. 
Mitigation policies are costly and 
time-consuming, and the requirements 
often conflict among agencies. Develop-
ers complain that mitigation complicates 
the regulatory process and introduces un-
certainty into project planning. Environ-
mental groups often view mitigation as 
ineffective in protecting natural re-
sources and as meager consolation in 
their effort to preserve natural areas. In 
general, current mitigation practices are 
economically inefficient and often un-
successful in reproducing the habitat 
lost, leaving all parties dissatisfied. 
The idea of "banking" mitigation ef-
forts grew out of the frustration of de-
velopment interests, environmental 
groups, and regulatory agencies. Mitiga-
tion banking occurs where one or more 
development interest agrees to restore or 
create significant natural habitat prior to 
impacting similar habitat. The developer 
receives "mitigation credits" for the 
amount of habitat successfully restored, 
much like a deposit in a mitigation "bank 
account." The developer is then allowed 
to use the credits as compensation for 
environmental impacts from future pro-
jects. 
In theory, mitigation banking pro-
vides the potential for more successful 
mitigation projects, reduced mitigation 
costs, a streamlined regulatory process 
for development, greater regulatory pre-
dictability, and new business opportuni-
ties in restoration sciences. 
The use of mitigation banking as a 
wetland management and planning tool 
is gaining notoriety, with considerable 
support and opposition to the concept, 
and is fast becoming one of the key nat-
ural resources issues of the 1990s. Once 
understood, it is an issue which prompts 
an immediate reaction. To developers, 
mitigation banking is a mechanism 
which satisfies environmental regula-
tions and enables them to compensate for 
habitat loss in an efficient, predictable 
manner. To regulatory officials, it is an 
undesirable necessity of permitting in a 
densely populated, resource-depleted 
state. To scientists, it is a premature leap 
forward into an uncertain science of hab-
itat restoration and creation. To planners, 
it is a broadbrush method of incorporat-
ing regional environmental concerns into 
the planning process. To conservation-
ists, it represents a potential relaxation 
of environmental standards and a license 
to destroy an already scarce, valuable 
resource. 
This disagreement reveals a central 
issue which must be addressed: Too little 
is known about the biological and eco-
nomic success of mitigation banking, 
and this knowledge will improve only 
through practice and experimentation. 
This article introduces the reader to the 
issues surrounding mitigation and miti-
gation banking, and suggests the incor-
poration of experimentation as a supple-
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ment to wetland enhancement require-
ments to encourage and accelerate the 
likelihood of success as the concept 
evolves. 
PROBLEMS 
PECULIAR TO CALIFORNIA 
Over the past half-century, California 
has been a leader in social, political, and 
legal trends. Not all of these trends, how-
ever, are positive. California ranks among 
the leaders in the destruction of wetland 
resources, and wildlife habitats are be-
coming rapidly depleted in the face of 
domestic and industrial development. 
California's solutions to this destruction 
have been suitably trendy, and include 
the occasional use of mitigation banking 
as an answer to the struggle between 
enormous development pressures and the 
desire to preserve the region's natural 
biodiversity. Several peculiar California 
resource conditions deserve ·brief men-
tion to permit a better understanding of 
why the mitigation banking debate has 
advanced so quickly in California. 
Coastal Population Concentration. 
The impact of urban development on 
coastal wetland resources cannot be 
overstated: 64% of the state's population 
lives in the coastal counties, and 76% of 
these people Jive south of Ventura 
County. 1 In southern California, twenty 
million people Jive along 200 miles of 
shoreline.2 These populations result in 
inordinate pressures to develop the re-
maining wetland and watershed lands,3 
with houses, marinas, and shopping cen-
ters replacing remnant wetlands.4 
Transportation corridors within the 
coastal areas have resulted in direct and 
indirect impacts to wetland resources.5 
The direct impacts of urbanization in-
clude roads and rail lines located on wet-
land fill. In southern California, the em-
blematic coastal drive has altered the hy-
drology of nearly every coastal wetland 
by constricting the tidal openings to nar-
row bridge underpasses and inhibiting 
the natural migration of the openings. As 
a result, most southern California coastal 
wetlands are closed to tidal flushing for 
much of the year. 
1 
2 
Indirect impacts from urban areas 
have been at least as devastating to the 
California wetland resource. Intrusion of 
domestic animals into wetland areas has 
led to predation on wetland-dependent 
birds and animals.6 Moreover, the mere 
presence of humans in a salt marsh has 
been found to instigate a flight reflex in 
some marsh birds from as far as 195 feet 
away.7 Other impacts are more subtle. 
Coastal sand dunes once created a barrier 
between many coastal wetland areas and 
the ocean. Most of these dunes have 
been developed for coastal housing. In 
the few areas where the dunes remain, 
foot traffic has killed much of the vege-
tation that once anchored the sand creat -
ing the dunes. Once denuded of vegeta-
tion, the sand is easily blown away or 
washed into the ocean, making the dune 
system gradually disappear. Eventually, 
the dunes become reduced to the point 
where storm surges can wash over them, 
pushing sand into tidal channels of the 
adjacent wetland. The constricted chan-
nels can lead to devastatinf effects on 
the wildlife of the wetland. 
Wetland Habitat Loss in Califor-
nia. Estimates of wetland habitat loss in 
California vary considerably depending 
on the scope of the estimate; however, 
any way the numbers are presented, the 
message is staggering.9 Statewide, it is 
estimated that only 10% of the wetland 
acreage present in the mid- l 800s re-
mains today. IO The largest loss of wet-
lands has occurred in the Central Valley 
and Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
Delta, where 95% of the four million 
acres of historic marsh and swamplands 
has been reclaimed for africulture since 
the nineteenth century. 1 The Klamath 
Basin has lost 60% of historic wetlands 
to agricultural reclamation and federal 
water projects. 12 In the San Francisco 
Bay Area, about 75% of historic wet-
lands have been lost to port and harbor 
development, urban expansion, industrial 
development and military installations. 13 
In southern California, over three-fourths 
of the coastal wetland habitat has been 
destroyed, with nearly all of the remain-
ing habitat greatly disturbed. 14 In Los 
Angeles and Orange counties, tidal wet-
lands have been reduced by 90%, and 
are considered more "museum pieces" 
than wildlife habitat. 15 In fact, the only 
regions in the state which retain more 
than half of their historic wetland acre-
age are the north and central coast areas, 
where urban and agricultural pressures 
are minimal. 16 
The impact of the loss of wetland 
habitat is reflected in the decline of the 
plant and animal species which rely on 
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it. At least 24 wetland-dependent animal 
species and several more plant species 
are currently listed as state or federal en-
dangered species. 17 Many of the state's 
coastal fisheries declined rapidly after 
the turn of the century as intertidal and 
wetland areas were lost. 18 One of the 
best-documented declines has been the 
reduction in waterfowl and shorebirds. 19 
Once a wintering and breeding haven for 
these migratory birds, California wet-
lands now represent an ecological bottle-
neck for waterfowl populations.20 
Ironically, the lack of wetlands in 
California has compounded the mitiga-
tion problem by creating a shortage of 
potential wetland restoration or creation 
sites. In the San Francisco Bay Area 
alone, one million dollars has accrued 
from various projects which have trig-
gered mitigation requirements, but there 
is no place to implement them.21 In 
southern California, many coastal wet-
land areas are constrained in narrow val-
leys, restricting the ability to create 
"new" wetland habitat.22 
Water Scarcity. The scarcity of 
water and the escalating demand for it 
have presented a myriad of problems for 
wetland areas throughout the state. In 
southern California, dams to create res-
ervoirs for urban water supplies have al-
tered the hydrology and sedimentation 
patterns of most streams, leading to a 
deficit in shoreline sand replenishment 
and accelerated coastal erosion.23 At the 
same time, unregulated clearing and con-
struction in watersheds has led to the de-
posit of excessive amounts of sediments 
in downstream wetlands where hydrol-
ogy is insufficient to carry them offshore. 
As a result, wetlands become clogged 
with fine sediments, reducing the ability 
of the wetland to maintain tidal flush-
ing.24 
The uncertain nature of the California 
water supply for wetland management 
has led to indirect incentives for agricul-
tural conversion in the Central Valley.25 
At the same time, increased demand for 
water in the state has led to net exports 
of streamflow from northern California, 
depriving many wetland areas of ade-
quate water. 
MITIGATION: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
In laying the groundwork for under-
standing the mitigation banking debate, 
it is necessary to understand that the con-
troversy begins with widespread dis-
agreement regarding the appropriate def-
inition of the term "mitigation" itself in 
law, regulation, and practice.26 The myr-
iad of definitions of the term that have 
been adopted by the various parties in-
volved in the mitigation debate make it 
difficult to offer any precise definition of 
"mitigation" as it relates to wetland pol-
icy. Much of the mitigation debate has 
centered on this very question. 
Historical Use of Mitigation. The 
use of mitigation requirements in wild-
life resource management dates back to 
the 1950s, when "resource mitigation" 
was used to compensate for the effects 
of dams on anadromous fish populations 
through the construction of hatcheries or 
fish passages to lessen the impact of de-
velopment on a specific population of 
animals.27 With the environmental 
movement in the 1970s came an expan-
sion of the mitigation concept to address 
broader types of resource losses, and a 
new management emphasis on habitat 
preservation rather than single species 
preservation.28 This shift in emphasis 
prompted calls for new kinds of mitiga-
tion, including the acquisition and pres-
ervation of natural habitat to compensate 
for habitat lost to development, reduc-
tions in pollutants from existing sources 
to compensate for new sources of pollu-
tion, and the creation, restoration, and 
enhancement of sensitive habitat to re-
place lost habitat values.29 
Shortly thereafter, the federal Fish 
and Wildlife Coordination Act 
(FWCA)30 and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)31 provided 
early statutory authority for mitigation 
requirements related to federal projects 
and federally-issued permits. 32 Addi-
tional authority was later provided by 
several executive proclamations.33 These 
legislative and executive actions, how-
ever, amounted to little more than ac-
knowledgements of mitigation require-
ments without providing guidance for 
how and when they should be applied. 
A Federal Regulatory Definition. 
After a decade of misunderstanding and 
regulatory confusion regarding the 
meaning of the term "mitigation," the 
President's Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) offered guidelines in 
1978 which focused on five elements: 
(a) avoiding the environmental im-
pact altogether by not taking a certain 
action or parts of an action; 
(b) minimizing the impact by limiting 
the degree or magnitude of the action 
and its implementation; 
(c) rectifying the impact by repairing, 
rehabilitating, or restoring the affected 
environment; 
(d) reducing or eliminating the impact 
over time by preservation and mainte-
nance operations during the life of the 
action; and 
California Regulatory Law Reporter• Vol. 13, Nos. 2&3 (Spring/Summer 1993) 
(e) compensating for the impact by 
replacing or providing substitute re-
sources or environments.34 
This language became the accepted 
regulatory definition of "mitigation" and, 
for the first time, regulatory agencies 
could point to a single, concise set of 
words that codified the "official" mean-
ing of the term. Unfortunately, no inter-
pretive guidance accompanied the defi-
nition regarding the proper application of 
the five elements. Thus, the primary 
issue in mitigation policy shifted from 
the meaning of the term to the manner 
in which it should be applied. 
Other Key Terms in the Mitigation 
Debate. Before discussing the issues sur-
rounding the proper application of miti-
gation, it is worth noting that the incon-
sistent use of other terms by developers, 
public agencies, states, and municipali-
ties has compounded the confusion sur-
rounding mitigation. In an effort to pro-
vide some order to the terminology ap-
plied to wetland mitigation, the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
coordinated a 1989 nationwide census of 
wetland scientists, regulators, and man-
agers regarding the proper definitions of 
key terms.35 The following frequently 
used terms deserve abbreviated defini-
tions for a consistent understanding in 
the discussion to follow. These terms 
have been defined in different language 
by other sources; however, the following 
definitions represent the general consen-
sus, according to the EPA survey.36 
• Restoration: returned from a dis-
turbed or totally altered condition to a 
previously existing, natural, or altered 
condition by some action by man. Res-
toration refers to the return of a tj'fe of 
habitat to a preexisting condition. 
• Creation: the conversion of persis-
tent non-wetland area into a wetland 
through some activity of man. This def-
inition presumes the site has not been a 
wetland within recent times (I 00-200 
years) and thus restoration is not occur-
ring. There are two types of created wet-
lands: artificial and man-induced. Artifi-
cial wetlands require some continuous or 
persistent activity of man (e.g., irrigation 
or weeding) to exist. Man-induced wet-
lands generally result from a one-time 
action of man and persist on their own. 38 
Of the various types of compensatory 
mitigation, this is the most technically 
challen~ing and the most uncertain of 
success. 9 Consequently, it is the least 
desirable form of manipulative mitiga-
tion. 
• Enhancement: the increase in one 
or more values of all or a portion of an 
existing wetland by man's activities, 
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often with an accompanying decline in 
other wetland values.40 Enhancement 
and restoration are often confused. En-
hancement is considered the intentional 
alteration of an existing wetland to pro-
vide conditions which previously did not 
exist and which, by consensus, increase 
one or more values.41 
• Success: achieving established 
goals. Success in wetlands restoration, 
creation, and enhancement ideally re-
quires that quantitative criteria be estab-
lished prior to commencement of these 
activities. It is important to note that a 
project may not succeed in achieving its 
goals, yet may still provide some other 
values deemed acceptable upon evalua-
tion. In such a case, the project may fail, 
but habitat is nevertheless established. In 
situations where poor or nonexistent 
goal-setting occurred, functional equiva-
lency may be determined by comparison 
with a reference wetland, and success de-
fined by this comparison.42 
• Onsite Mitigation: compensatory 
mitigation which occurs adjacent to or in 
the immediate vicinity of the impacted 
habitat. Generally considered to be a part 
of the same functioning ecosystem, and 
considered preferable to offsite mitiga-
tion.43 Replacement wetlands should be 
created or restored as near the original 
wetland site as possible to ensure that the 
benefits of the original wetland continue 
to be enjoyed locally.44 
• Of/site Mitigation: compensatory 
mitigation occurring outside the ecosys-
tem sustaining the impacts of the pro-
posed development. Considered less 
preferable than onsite mitigation because 
compensation is geographically removed 
from impacts, leadin~ to a localized de-
pletion of resources. 5 
• In-kind Replacement: providing or 
managing substitute resources to replace 
functional values of the resources lost, 
where such substitute resources are 
physically and biologically the same or 
closely approximate those lost.46 
• Out-of-kind Replacement: provid-
ing or managing substitute resources to 
replace functional values of the re-
sources lost, where such substitute re-
sources are physically or biologically 
different from those lost.47 Out-of-kind 
replacement is generally avoided be-
cause it fails to restore the habitat values 
that were lost.48 
Avoidance or Compensation? As 
various agencies attempted to implement 
the mitigation concept outlined by the 
CEQ in 1978, most failed to coordinate 
these efforts among themselves. As a re-
sult, single projects often received very 
different mitigation requirements from 
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different agencies.49 It became clear that 
a unified policy was necessary to provide 
consistency in the government's applica-
tion of the concept; however, the resource 
community was sharply divided on 
which policy should be adopted. 
Through the 197Os, the common appli-
cation of "mitigation" meant both avoid-
ing damage to sensitive areas and carry-
ing out some form of compensation for 
damage which has occurred.50 This dual 
usage of the term became the root of the 
mitigation debate, as some agencies saw 
impact avoidance as a prerequisite to 
compensation, while others saw the use 
of avoidance as discretionary. 
The first federal attempt to produce a 
uniform policy on mitigation application 
came in 1981, when the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS) published its 
FWS Mitigation Policy.51 The FWS Mit-
igation Policy declared the elements in 
the CEQ definition,52 in the order listed, 
as the desirable sequence of steps to be 
used in the mitigation planning process, 
and set guidelines for mitigation goals 
based on resource categories. Simply 
put, USFWS identified four resource cat-
egories, decreasing in importance, with 
corresponding mitigation goals with de-
creasing levels of stringency. The level 
of mitigation to be required corre-
sponded with the value and scarcity of 
the habitat at risk.53 USFWS' adoption 
of this policy of applying the mitigation 
definition sequentially, with an emphasis 
on the avoidance of impacts, has been 
identified as the turning point in the mit-
igation debate.54 The Policy emphasizes 
that although "mitigation" is often de-
fined in terms of habitat restoration, cre-
ation, or enhancement to compensate for 
project-related impacts, such compensa-
tion is viewed as the least favored 
method of mitigation. The heart of the 
Policy is the avoidance of damage alto-
gether, rather than an attempt to repair 
damage after it occurs.55 The FWS Mit-
igation Policy was eventually adopted by 
EPA.56 
Some agencies-notably the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)-re-
sisted the "sequential" application of the 
mitigation definition, preferring instead 
to base mitigation requirements on a bal-
ancing of the public interest in a given 
project. 57 In 1985, the Corps explicitly 
adopted the position that "mitigation" 
(including compensation) should be con-
sidered throughout the permit process, 
and refused to view it in a step-wise 
fashion.58 In balancing the public inter-
est benefits of a project against its det-
riments, the Corps used "mitigation" to 
tip the public interest balance so that a 
3 
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project might be found in the public in-
terest.59 According to David Barrows, 
fonnerly of the Office of the Chief of 
Engineers in Washington, D.C., the fac-
tors used to mitigate projects in this way 
include project adjustments relating to 
fish and wildlife resources, water quality, 
erosion control, navigation, historic 
properties, and economics.60 The Corps 
viewed mitigation as a tool to allow the 
authorization of a construction project.61 
The Corps' interpretation of federal 
mitigation policy acquired heightened 
importance because of its key role in re-
viewing dredge and fill permit applica-
tions under section 404 of the federal 
Clean Water Act (CWA) and section 10 
of the River and Harbors Act.62 Both of 
these Acts regulate activities limited to 
aquatic or wetland habitats. Section 404 
of the CWA prohibits the discharge of 
any pollutants into the nation's waters 
without a pennit.63 Following consider-
able congressional debate regarding the 
proper agency to oversee the permit pro-
gram,64 a compromise enabled EPA and 
the Corps to share custody of the pro-
gram.65 It was decided that primary per-
mitting authority under section 404 
would be administered by the Corps,66 
with EPA maintaining statutory power to 
veto an~ Corps permits erroneously 
granted. 7 EPA was also required to pro-
duce specific guidelines ("404(b)(I) 
guidelines") with the Corps for use in 
Corps pennit application decisions, and 
to help detennine the extent of section 
404 jurisdiction.68 The mitigation re-
quirements for the permitting program 
originate from these EPA guidelines, but 
are initially administered by the Corps. 
Unfortunately, the Corps and EPA have 
rarely agreed on the interpretation of 
these guidelines and have become the 
fighting Siamese twins of wetlands reg-
ulation. 
EPA incorporated the sequential ap-
plication of the mitigation concept into 
the 404(b)(I) guidelines when they were 
promulgated in 1980.69 As noted above, 
the Corps disagreed with the guidelines' 
emphasis on avoidance of impacts, pre-
ferring instead to sidestep the avoidance 
issue and consider compensatory mitiga-
tion throughout the permit process. 
While the Corps' approach pennitted ap-
plicants to demonstrate their willingness 
to cooperate and contribute to wetland 
value concerns, it is also presupposed 
that a pennit would not be denied. This 
latter factor was attractive to agency staff 
members who were under pressure to 
avoid lengthy delays and potential litiga-
tion because it eliminated the possibility 
of a fifth amendment "takings" challenge 
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to the agency's actions, since the agency 
would not outright deny the pennit.70 At 
a time when the emphasis of Corps per-
sonnel was on processing pennits and 
not on protecting the resource, this short-
cut method through the ~ennit process 
was extremely attractive. 1 The danger 
of this approach, according to EPA 
sources, was that it violated the basic 
definition of mitigation being used by 
other agencies.72 By accepting mitiga-
tion proposals for habitat enhancement 
or replacement up front, mitigation be-
came a sort of currency for the destruc-
tion of wetlands.73 
The Corps' policy, which was widely 
supported by the development industry 
and adopted by some state and local reg-
ulatory agencies, caused many people to 
wrongly associate mitigation exclusively 
with terms such as the creation, restora-
tion, or enhancement of wetland habi-
tat.74 This led to the tendency for many 
involved in the business of mitigation to 
begin debating the technical issues of in-
dividual proposals without first address-
ing the more important philosophical 
issue of whether the impacts to the 
resource were reasonable or justifiable in 
the first place. 75 
The conflicting mitigation policies of 
EPA and the Corps met head on in 
Bersani v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency,76 which tested the EPA's veto 
power under section 404 and the proper 
application of the section 404(b)( I) 
guidelines.77 In Bersani, EPA vetoed the 
Corps' issuance of a section 404 permit 
on the basis of erroneous application of 
the 404(b )(I) guidelines and of the fed-
eral mitigation policy. The basic premise 
of the veto was that the 404(b )( 1) guide-
lines do not allow mitigation as a remedy 
for destroying wetlands when practicable 
alternatives exist.78 The developer sued 
to overturn the veto. The district court 
and the Second Circuit upheld the veto, 
noting that use of the 404(b )(I) guide-
lines in permit review is mandatory, 
while the public interest review, which 
the Corps used in approving the pennit, 
is only discretionary.79 The court also 
endorsed EPA's influence in the section 
404 program by interpreting the guide-
lines to "provide an incentive to avoid 
choosing wetlands" for development. 80 
EPA's policy against using mitigation to 
offset the filling of existing wetlands re-
sources was also accepted as reasonable 
by the court.81 
Current Federal Mitigation Policy: 
The EPA/Corps Mitigation MOA. The 
primary benefit of Bersani was that it 
forced the agencies to sit down and agree 
to a unified policy on mitigation. On No-
vember 15, 1989, the Department of the 
Army, USFWS, and EPA ended their 
protracted dispute over mitigation by 
signing a memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) stating that mitigation alone may 
not provide a basis for issuing a section 
404 permit.82 The MOA accepted EPA's 
longstanding sequencing approach to 
mitigation, permitting mitigation to be 
considered only after a project meets 
pennit criteria without the aid of mitiga-
tion. 83 Compensatory mitigation is no 
longer allowed to reduce the environ-
mental impacts in the evaluation of the 
least dama~ing practicable alternatives to 
a project. 4 The memorandum also 
adopts other mitigation criteria which 
were formerly only disputed policy, in-
cluding an overall standard for mitiga-
tion as replacement of functional value, 
consistent with a "no net loss policy. "85 
The "no net loss" policy has become 
a favorite political catch phrase which 
many politicians and agency administra-
tors have used to characterize their views 
as "pro-environment." These speakers 
interpret the phrase simplistically to 
mean that no wetland acreage will be 
lost on a specific project, either on a 
regionwide or nationwide basis. In other 
words, for every acre of wetland im-
pacted or lost, a new acre must be cre-
ated or restored so that there is "no net 
loss" of wetlands. However, this is not 
the intent of EPA's "no net loss" policy. 
The new memorandum of agreement 
corrected misinterpretations of the policy 
to require no net loss of functional wet-
land values.86 The functional value of 
one acre of restored or created wetland 
is not equivalent to an acre of natural 
habitat; thus, if the "no net loss" policy 
is used on the basis of acreage, there 
would necessarily be a net loss of wet-
land functional values. 
The effective date of the MOA was 
delayed twice by the White House in re-
sponse to criticism from the Departments 
of Energy and Transportation, the oil and 
gas industry, and development interests 
in Alaska. The final version of the mem-
orandum-which contained substantive 
revisions regarding Alaska-became ef-
fective on February 7, 1990. 87 These re-
visions-which allow for less than one-
to-one functional replacement of wet-
lands filled in the state of Alaska-have 
been criticized as precluding a realistic 
national goal of "no net loss" of wetland 
functional values, making the agreement 
internally inconsistent. 88 
To reiterate, the current Corps/EPA/ 
USFWS policy on mitigation explicitly 
states that the applicant may propose 
compensatory mitigation only as a last 
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resort. The applicant must first avoid im-
pacts to the wetland; second, it must 
minimize those impacts, third, it must try 
to repair or rehabilitate the habitat that 
would be damaged. Therefore, it is es-
sential to preface the forthcoming dis-
cussion of mitigation banking with the 
acknowledgement that the realm of mit-
igation banking applies only to projects 
resulting in unavoidable habitat loss. Be-
fore a project proponent reaches the 
stage where mitigation banking may be 
discussed, the first three steps of the mit-
igation policy must be carried out to 
their fullest extent. 
California Mitigation Policy. Cali-
fornia wetlands protection law consists 
of a patchwork of state and local laws, 
ordinances, regulations, and policy state-
ments that at times are redundant, and at 
others leave regulatory gaps. 89 This frag-
mentation has left California without a 
unified or predictable statewide mitiga-
tion policy. Compounding this problem 
is the fact that the state has an abundance 
of environmental statutes which require 
some form of mitigation.90 In the ab-
sence of a clear statewide policy, it may 
be helpful to understand the mandates of 
a few of the major agencies which influ-
ence mitigation practices in California. 
Department of Fish and Game. The 
primary role of the Department of Fish 
and Game (DFG) is trustee for the wel-
fare of the state's fish, wildlife, and plant 
resources.91 DFG has no direct permit or 
regulatory authority over wetlands, but 
does regulate construction activities 
which may "divert, obstruct, or change 
the natural flow or the bed, channel, or 
bank of any river, stream, or lake desig-
nated by [DFG] .... "92 DFG's role in wet-
lands regulation on private land is lim-
ited to reviewing projects and providin_g 
advisory comments and information.93 
Permitting agencies must consult with 
DFG as the "trustee agency" for natural 
resources whenever a project impacts 
fish and wildlife resources.94 Addition-
ally, DFG is authorized by the Fish and 
Wildlife Coordination Act to provide 
comments on federal projects impacting 
California's natural resources, including 
all section 404 permits.95 
DFG and the Fish and Game Com-
mission96 have adopted a policy regard-
ing protection of wetlands which reflects 
an extremely optimistic view of man's 
capability to create or restore functional 
wetland habitats.97 The policy's basic 
tenet is that projects should not result in 
a net loss of either wetland acreage or 
wetland habitat value.98 The policy also 
states that "mitigation and compensation 
of project impacts through acquisitions 
FEATURE ARTICLE 
and restoration has been the responsibil-
ity of project beneficiaries."99 DFG con-
veys this message through project re-
view, analysis, and negotiations with 
other resource agencies and private indi-
viduals using several "wetland impact 
minimization techniques." IOO 
Coastal Regulation. The most im-
portant state provision regarding coastal 
wetlands and mitigation is the Coastal 
Act of 1976. IOI The Coastal Act prohib-
its coastal development projects involv-
ing the diking, dredging, or filling of 
wetlands unless they fit into one of eight 
categories. 102 Ironically, several of these 
categories have been major causes of 
degradation of the coastal wetlands 
resource. 103 The Coastal Act is primarily 
administered by the California Coastal 
Commission, which may require mitiga-
tion before ap~roving a coastal develop-
ment project. 04 Coastal Commission 
staff considers the Coastal Act "inter-
nally balanced"-that is, the statute al-
ready balances economic and develop-
ment concerns with wildlife and environ-
mental concerns. 105 As such, there is no 
need to balance the Coastal Act provis-
ions against economic concerns when 
making permitting decisions. 
The Coastal Commission also admin-
isters the federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act (CZMA). 106 Pursuant to the 
CZMA, the Commission implements the 
California Coastal Management Pro-
gram, which clarifies the state coastal re-
sources policy, and allows for the dele-
gation of the Commission's duties to 
local governments upon apwoval of a 
local coastal program (LCP). 07 Pursuant 
to this program, the Coastal Commission 
(or a certified local government) issues 
coastal development permits for all pro-
jects and structural activities in the 
coastal zone. 108 
Before a coastal development permit 
to dike, fill, or dredge wetlands is issued, 
the Commission must find that there is 
not a feasible, less damaging alternative, 
that feasible mitigation measures have 
been provided to minimize adverse en-
vironmental impacts, and that the func-
tional capacity of wetland areas are 
maintained or enhanced. 109 In this re-
spect, the Commission apparently uses 
the "common law" definition of mitiga-
tion, which emphasizes compensation 
for wetland impacts rather than avoid-
ance of impacts altogether. 110 The con-
tinued use of this definition of mitigation 
adds confusion to the state/federal per-
mitting scheme. 
Water Resources Control Board. The 
Water Resources Control Board 
(WRCB)1 11 regulates wetlands indirectly 
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through section 401 of the Clean Water 
Act. Section 401 requires state water 
quality certification as a prerequisite to 
issuance of a section 404 dredge and fill 
permit. 112 The WRCB may indirectly in-
fluence mitigation plans by instilling 
conditions on the 401 certification which 
must be accounted for in a mitigation 
plan.113 
The Water Resources Control Board 
is currently considering whether to reis-
sue nationwide permits under the section 
404 permit program. 114 The WRCB has 
the option of requiring individual section 
401 water quality certification for each 
project falling under the jurisdiction of 
the nationwide permit program. If the 
Board decides to exercise this authority, 
its ability to condition permit approval 
upon specific mitigation needs will 
vastly increase. 
Problems with Mitigation. As state 
and federal agencies have struggled to 
interpret, apply, and enforce mitigation 
requirements in development projects 
within their jurisdiction, several prob-
lems and criticisms have emerged which 
have resulted-in part-in the concept 
of mitigation banking. The following 
discussion provides an overview of the 
main criticisms of mitigation policies 
which have surfaced over the last ten 
years. 
One of the primary criticisms of wet-
land mitigation is that it is used as a jus-
tification for wetland alteration. As noted 
earlier, EPA and USFWS view mitiga-
tion as a "last resort" form of compen-
sation for unavoidable environmental 
impacts. These agencies require that ef-
forts to avoid wetland impacts be ex-
hausted before compensation is consid-
ered. However, the reality in many pro-
jects is that the developer ignores the 
avoidance prerequisite and comes to the 
table with a project which is sited in a 
wetland area and is accompanied by ei-
ther a mitigation plan or a proposal to 
consult agency officials on mitigation. 
Even when this approach is rebuffed by 
resource agencies, however, few devel-
opers are discouraged to the point of 
abandoning their projects. 115 
The uncertainty of success of wetland 
restoration and creation projects is per-
haps the most important hurdle which 
mitigation policy must overcome. While 
some types of habitats have apparently 
been successfully restored, the technol-
ogy for restoring most types of habitats 
is completely inadequate. For example, 
some riparian habitats located in south-
ern California have been restored fairly 
successfully. 116 However, these projects 
were sited in areas which probably 
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would have revegetated on their own in 
only slightly more time than it took with 
the restoration effort. 117 On the other 
hand, many mitigation projects try to 
create too many types of habitat in one 
area in order to accommodate more spe-
cies at one site. These projects propose 
increasing the quality of habitat in ex-
change for quantity, but generally result 
in uncertainty or-more likely-a de-
crease in both quantity and quality. 118 
Mitigation involving compensation, 
particularly with regard to habitat cre-
ation and restoration, is still considered 
an experimental process (at best) that has 
been applied only on a limited basis. 119 
The degree of uncertainty associated 
with mitigation parallels the amount of 
manipulation necessary to satisfy project 
needs. Wetland enhancement has the 
highest relative probability of success, 
followed by wetland restoration, and-
finally-wetland creation. 
In almost any mitigation project, 
some wetland vegetation can usually be 
planted and survive. However, it is has 
yet to be shown that an entire ecosystem 
can be replaced or restored. The various 
functions of very complicated natural 
systems are simply not totally under-
stood.120 Thus, the assumption upon 
which most mitigation projects rely is 
only that-an assumption which has 
often been unquestioned, even by resource 
agencies. 
By conceding the loss of wetland 
habitat values and moving directly to 
discuss the issues of mitigation and the 
technical merits of a proposal, a regula-
tory agency loses sight of the big picture. 
The more important philosophical ques-
tion is whether mitigation practices such 
as habitat restoration and creation are 
reasonable or justifiable in light of the 
overall costs to the resource. For exam-
ple, regardless of the quality or good in-
tentions of a mitigation project, some 
known habitat will be lost, and the short-
and long-term success of the mitigation 
project may remain uncertain for a num-
ber of years. Thus, there is necessarily a 
trade-off of the loss of a known com-
modity in exchange for an uncertain 
commodity. 
The conspicuous absence of data re-
lating to large-scale creation of wetland 
ecosystems is even more troubling in 
light of the assumptions of success often 
made in mitigation policies. Historical 
attempts to revegetate dredge spoils and 
marsh areas with limited plantinip do not 
create a functioning ecosystem. 21 Even 
when a wetland area is carefully planted 
and monitored, the functional success 
may not be attained for many, many 
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years. 122 As such, wetland creation 
should be a last resort, compensating for 
completely unavoidable impacts associ-
ated with water-dependent projects. 
Moreover, wetland creation should never 
be used to justify destruction of produc-
tive wetlands. 
It can hardly be denied that habitat 
restoration and enhancement benefit a 
degrading wetland system. However, the 
real issue is whether to allow wetland 
destruction conditioned upon promises 
or guarantees of wetland restoration or 
creation, when both practices are based 
upon an imperfect science and raise sub-
stantial institutional problems. 123 
Even if a project is successful in tak-
ing on many of the attributes of a natural 
habitat, there is still the intangible loss 
of the character and history of the habitat 
which is irreplaceable. To say that habi-
tats may be destroyed because we can 
recreate them is much like saying that 
once we have the technology to balance 
stones on top of each other, we can rec-
reate Stonehenge and build a shopping 
mall over the original. 124 Much of the 
value of any natural ecosystem is that 
each has its own history and no two are 
identical. This value is not static; rather, 
it is temporal and is difficult to quan-
tify-in fact, so difficult that it is rou-
tinely ignored in habitat value assess-
ments. 
Another critical issue is whether a 
mitigation project should replace pre-
cisely the same functions that are being 
lost by the development project. In other 
words, should wetland replacement be 
in-kind (the same habitat type and size) 
or out-of-kind (of different type and 
size)? The danger of out-of-kind mitiga-
tion is that habitats which are difficult to 
restore or enhance may be depleted and 
not effectively replaced if they can be 
mitigated for by restoring a different 
type of wetland. Out-of-kind mitigation 
leads to a net loss of habitat values of 
the impacted habitat type. On the other 
hand, out-of-kind mitigation may be de-
sirable if a more scarce or valuable hab-
itat is in critical need of expansion and 
the habitat lost to development is rela-
tively abundant. 
Another controversial mitigation 
issue is whether mitigation should take 
place onsite (on or immediately adjacent 
to the impacted site) or offsite (within a 
reasonable distance from the impacted 
site). One of the dangers in allowing 
offsite mitigation is that it promotes frag-
mentation of wetland habitat. USFWS' 
mitigation policy states that first priority 
will be given to recommendation of a 
mitigation site within the planning area, 
and then adjacent to the project area; last 
priority is given to recommendation of 
mitigation sites elsewhere within the 
same ecoregion of the project. 125 
The parties responsible for carrying 
out mitigation projects have also become 
increasingly frustrated with mitigation 
policies due to the costs and delay asso-
ciated with mitigation. Developers saw 
the costs of mitigation projects skyrocket 
in the I 980s. The constantly changing 
regulatory environment and shifting 
agency policies have created an uncer-
tain backdrop in which developers must 
estimate project costs. Lengthy project 
delays are common as permit applicants 
and regulatory agencies discuss the de-
tails of mitigation requirements. If a 
project is materially changed during con-
struction, delays of months or even years 
may result due to a backlog of permit 
applications and/or the refusal of one 
party to change the mitigation agree-
ment. 
These problems with mitigation pol-
icy have been relatively easy to identify. 
Finding their solutions is much more dif-
ficult. The need for increased certainty 
of success in mitigation projects, prefer-
ably ascertained before impacting the 
resource, is viewed by biologists as the 
top priority. Standardizing and consoli-
dating regulatory requirements is also 
necessary to instill predictability into the 
planning process. In troubling economic 
times, the development industry wants to 
reduce the costs of mitigation as much 
as possible. Regulatory agencies that are 
finding themselves overworked and un-
derstaffed need a way to manage their 
resources in a more efficient way. The 
proposed use of mitigation banking is 
seen as a potential method of resolving 
many of these issues. Unfortunately, it 
may exacerbate some of the existing 
problems and create new ones. 
MITIGATION BANKING 
GENERALLY 
The term "mitigation bank" has been 
used to describe a wide variety of habitat 
management policies, only some of 
which are truly considered mitigation 
banks. 126 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service127 defines mitigation banking as 
" ... habitat protection or improvement ac-
tions taken expressly for the purpose of 
compensating for unavoidable, necessary 
losses from specific future development 
actions." 128 In practice, there is no such 
thing as a "typical" mitigation bank, and 
mitigation banking can work many vari-
ations off this central theme. 129 
A simple, one-party mitigation bank 
is similar to maintaining a bank ac-
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count. 130 A developer "opens an ac-
count" by entering into a memorandum 
of agreement with regulatory agencies to 
create, restore, or preserve wildlife hab-
itat in advance of an anticipated need for 
mitigation of impacts from a project. The 
benefits of these efforts are quantified by 
regulatory officials, and the developer 
receives a "balance" of mitigation credits 
in his or her account. Later, when the 
developer proposes a project that in-
cludes unavoidable losses of fish and 
wildlife habitat, the losses are quantified 
and withdrawn from the mitigation bank 
account. Withdrawals may be repeated as 
long as mitigation credits remain in the 
bank. The one-party mitigation bank has 
been used by individuals who frequently 
impact small or isolated areas of sensi-
tive habitat and who have sufficient cap-
ital to create the bank. These include 
large development and energy corpora-
tions and state Department of Transpor-
tation. 
A variation on the one-party mitiga-
tion bank is the cooperative banking 
group. In a mitigation bank co-op, sev-
eral development interests agree to pool 
their resources to create a mitigation 
bank. Each party to the agreement re-
ceives mitigation credits proportionate to 
their investment. Co-ops provide the 
small and medium-sized developer with 
an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of 
mitigation banking while sharing the 
threshold costs of regulatory review, land 
acquisition, and habitat restoration. This 
type of bank is likely to appeal to 
homebuilder associations and other mu-
tual interest organizations. 
Another increasingly popular varia-
tion of mitigation banking is the thirds 
party mitigation bank, which creates a 
market for mitigation credits. Under this 
scenario, an environmental restoration 
business independently acquires land 
and creates or restores wildlife habitat in 
order to create a mitigation bank ac-
count. Mitigation credits are then sold to 
development interests whose projects 
impact similar habitat types in the area. 
The benefit of this type of mitigation 
banking is that it makes optimal use of 
market forces through specialization, 
thus theoretically reducing the cost of 
mitigation to the developer. 
A true mitigation bank is markedly 
different from an "in-lieu fee program." 
In-lieu fee programs are processes 
whereby several developers agree with 
resource agencies to pay fees into an ac-
count that, when enough money has ac-
cumulated, is used to purchase and en-
hance a sensitive habitat area. In-lieu fee 
programs accumulate funds slowly, and 
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years may pass before a mitigation proj-
ect is initiated and habitat losses are 
compensated. 131 
As a result, in-lieu fee programs gen-
erally lead to temporary losses of habitat 
value. For example, in San Diego 
County, an in-lieu fee program was ini-
tiated to compensate for damage to ver-
nal pool habitats. An agreement was 
signed by DFG, USFWS, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, and the City of San 
Diego which allowed development and 
sale of certain lands in exchange for de-
posits into an account to purchase sensi-
tive property with vernal pools. The 
project was flawed in its initial design 
and was universally considered a dismal 
failure. 132 On the day the agreement was 
signed, the arrangement facilitated the 
loss of considerable vernal pool habitat 
and, even in a best-case scenario, would 
compensate for less than 1 0% of that 
loss. The reason for the "guaranteed fail-
ure" of this program was a refusal to re-
quire fees sufficient to acquire the nec-
essary land. The total funds available 
through the program were sufficient to 
purchase only 10% of the land based on 
per-acre values at the time the agreement 
was signed. After the agreement was 
signed, land prices escalated and the pro-
gram became essentially useless in pre-
serving the vernal pools. 
Elements of a Mitigation Bank. As 
noted, there is no such thing as a "typi-
cal" mitigation bank. However, there are 
certain elements which all mitigation 
banks must have in order to be identified 
as such. 
Bank Sponsor. First, there must be a 
project sponsor which develops a plan 
for creating new wetlands or restoring 
degrading wetlands in some other area. 
Mitigation bank sponsors historically 
have been industry or government enti-
ties. The plan developed by the bank's 
sponsor provides the basis for a memo-
randum of understanding among the var-
ious agencies which have permitting au-
thority over the mitigation bank. 
One of the bank sponsor's most dif-
ficult tasks is coordinating and mediating 
issues among the multitude of agencies 
and concerned interest groups that are in-
volved in the design and implementation 
of a mitigation bank. At minimum, these 
agencies include state and federal per-
mitting agencies such as the California 
Coastal Commission, the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, and the regional water 
quality control boards; local permitting 
agencies such as city and county plan-
ning commissions; commenting agencies 
such as DFG, USFWS, EPA, and the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service; environ-
California Regulatory Law Reporter• Vol. 13, Nos. 2&3 (Spring/Summer 1993) 
mental interest groups such as the Sierra 
Club and Audubon Society; and local de-
velopment interest groups. 133 With these 
cumbersome bureaucracies and interest 
groups, keeping the process moving to-
ward a consensus on the myriad of de-
cisions and issues among parties with di-
verging interests is one of the primary 
challenges which the bank's sponsor will 
encounter. 134 
Written Agreement. The key to suc-
cessful establishment of a mitigation 
bank is a written banking agreement 
which formalizes the consensus among 
signatory agencies about the characteris-
tics and use of the bank. The interagency 
agreement establishes guidelines for 
bank use and defines the allowable, re-
quired, and prohibited actions for all of 
the parties involved. 135 A formal bank 
agreement, usually known as a memo-
randum of understanding (MOU), gener-
ally involves all federal, state, and local 
permitting and commenting agencies 
with an interest in the outcome of the 
project. The consensus among federal 
agencies is that a mitigation bank MOU 
should accomplish all of the following 
goals: 
• specify that the bank may be used 
only when the permitting and comment-
ing agencies agree that onsite mitigation 
and other offsite mitigation options are 
not appropriate, and that the bank has the 
appropriate habitat value available; 
• include or reference comprehensive 
regional plans and goals to which the 
bank plan is related; 
• define the obligations and interests 
of each of the parties involved; 
• designate a mitigation bank over-
view team, if that team is different from 
the signatories to the formal banking 
agreement; 
• incorporate, at least by reference, 
the habitat enhancement plan, including 
a long-term management plan, a list of 
maintenance activities, and the entities 
responsible for these activities; 
• define the decisionmaking process 
that will be used if conflicts arise con-
cerning the agreement or the use of the 
bank; 
• establish who will hold legal title to 
the land and other legal arrangements for 
the bank land; 
• limit the use of the bank to a clearly 
defined geographic area; 
• establish the size of the bank; 
• include the methodology that will 
be used to determine bank credits and 
project debits, and the crediting and deb-
iting process; 
• establish a bank manager or coordi-
nator who will maintain the official re-
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cord of credit and debit transactions for 
the bank; 
• identify the particular types of hab-
itat eligible to be offset by the bank; 
• specify the procedure for continued 
monitoring and evaluation of the bank 
and related adjustments in bank manage-
ment or credits; and 
• include any other restrictions appro-
priate for the bank. 136 
In addition, the mitigation banking 
agreement should preserve the autonomy 
of the individual agencies. The signing 
of the MOU should not preclude any of 
the agencies from enforcing their respon-
sibility to take appropriate action should 
the bank later be used to facilitate inap-
propriate development projects or pro-
vide inadequate mitigation for project 
losses. 
Methods of Evaluating Success. The 
primary assumption in establishing a 
mitigation bank is that the restored or 
created habitat will be successful in du-
plicating the habitat values lost from the 
impacted site. Therefore, a clear, scien-
tifically acceptable method of detennin-
ing existing habitat values and evaluat-
ing habitat values following enhance-
ment of the bank site is an absolute ne-
cessity to any mitigation banking proj-
ect. This is one of the most important 
and most controversial elements of the 
mitigation banking concept. However, 
finding a system which is technically de-
fensible, replicable, consistent, and ap-
plicable to different 7-/Jes of habitat has 
proven problematic. 1 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's 
habitat evaluation procedure (HEP) has 
been commonly used in California; how-
ever, other pennitting agencies question 
the system's reliability and flexibility in 
evaluating mitigation success. 138 HEP 
analysis is susceptible to extreme bias 
and can be used to hide impacts caused 
by the mitigation project itself. 139 In ad-
dition to HEP, other methods of habitat 
evaluation have been developed or mod-
ified to specific projects, but these have 
also been sharply criticized. 140 
Duration. Nearly all agencies in-
volved in mitigation banking agree that 
if a development is pennanent, then the 
mitigation bank should also be created 
in perpetuity. Failure to create a perma-
nent wetland bank and adhere to this 
commitment is dangerous because 
land-particularly in California-be-
comes increasingly valuable as it be-
comes scarce. Wetland mitigation sites 
are already becoming increasingly 
scarce, and pressure will build to begin 
whittling away at the remaining sites as 
land values rise further. If the land is not 
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dedicated in perpetuity, the bank's effec-
tive period should be at least as long as 
the impact from the project which it mit-
igates. 
Other Features. Another key feature 
in establishing a mitigation bank is de-
ciding whether the land for the mitiga-
tion site will be publicly or privately 
owned. One advantage of keeping the 
land in private ownership is that it re-
tains a local property tax base141 and 
maintains a lead agency's role as risk 
manager, rather than landlord. Some pro-
jects have kept the site in private own-
ership until all of the mitigation credits 
are distributed, at which time the land is 
deeded to a resource agency or nature 
conservancy for management responsi-
bility in perpetuity. 142 Finally, a mitiga-
tion bank must have a managing agency 
which will oversee the management and 
maintenance of the habitat in perpetu-
ity_ 143 
Prerequisites to Establishing a Mit-
igation Bank. Projects for which miti-
gation banking is an option are a small 
subset of projects requiring mitigation. A 
majority of projects which are originally 
designed to impact wetlands should be 
filtered out before reaching the question 
of whether the use of a mitigation bank 
is appropriate. 144 Even among those few 
projects which may propose mitigation 
banking, the practice is only appropriate 
for a few. Most agencies involved in en-
vironmental permitting require the fol-
lowing prerequisites before considering 
use of a mitigation bank: 
• all attempts to avoid or minimize 
impacts and to provide onsite miti§ation 
have been absolutely exhausted; 14 
• there is a demonstrated public ben-
efit associated with the project which 
outweighs the foreseeable detrimental 
impacts on fish and wildlife resources; 
• if the project is sited in a wetland, 
the develo~ment project must be water-
dependent; 46 and 
• onsite mitigation means are unavail-
able or insufficient to meet project mit-
igation needs. 147 
If all of these prerequisites are met, 
then the possibility of creating (or using) 
a wetland mitigation bank exists. 
REGULATORY ACTION 
Federal Mitigation Banking Guide-
lines. There are currently no com-
prehensive guidelines for establishing a 
mitigation bank acceptable to all federal 
regulators. 148 As a result, project propo-
nents must piece together a general fed-
eral policy from independent actions of 
various agencies. 
The most well-known federal guide-
lines on m1t1gation banking originate 
from USFWS' Interim Guidance on Mit-
igation Banking, which was adopted in 
1983. 149 USFWS considers this Interim 
Guidance its current statement on the use 
of mitigation banks. The Interim Guid-
ance is used for all habitat types and is 
not restricted to wetland applications. 150 
It also emphasizes that banking is but 
one tool of many available to mitigate 
unavoidable resource losses. The steps 
recommended by USFWS in creating a 
mitigation bank include the following: 
• identify the agency or agencies with 
which it seems appropriate to consider a 
mitigation bank and form an interagency 
team; 
• identify an involved entity that is 
willing to develop the bank's site prior 
to its use as mitigation for project im-
pacts; 
• identify the types of wetlands that 
should be included in the bank, empha-
sizing in-kind mitigation requirements; 
• identify potential bank sites; 
• evaluate the potential bank sites and 
select the most suitable candidate sites; 
• select the bank site and acquire the 
land; 
• complete a detailed site develop-
ment plan and identify responsible enti-
ties for bank development and long-term 
management; 
• develop (restore or create habitat) 
the bank site and determine available 
credits using the selected evaluation 
methodology; 
• agree to the bank credit and debit 
procedures, including any restrictions on 
the use of bank credits; and 
• use the bank, as appropriate, to mit-
igate for necessary and unavoidable proj-
ect impacts. 151 
The Interim Guidance sets forth ten 
factors which must be considered in es-
tablishing and administering a wetland 
mitigation bank (the list is not inclu-
sive).152 In addition to its Interim Guid-
ance, USFWS has also released a short 
synopsis of mitigation banks with Fish 
and Wildlife Service involvement. 153 
This booklet expands on the principles 
of the Interim Guidance and reviews sev-
eral mitigation banks in progress or 
planned for the near future. 
EPA has not issued any fonnal na-
tionwide policy on mitigation banking; 
however, EPA's Office of Wetlands Pro-
tection released a policy statement to the 
National Wetlands Policy Forum in 
199 I. 154 The policy reiterates EPA's po-
sition on strict mitigation sequencing and 
applies this policy to mitigation banking 
as well. EPA defines wetlands mitigation 
banking as "a comprehensive advanced 
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planning approach for compensating for 
the unavoidable loss of wetlands or wet-
land functions resulting from develop-
ment actions where mitigation cannot be 
achieved at the site of impact." 155 The 
EPA definition includes restoration of 
existing wetlands and the creation of 
new wetlands from uplands; 156 however, 
EPA considers the simple purchase or 
"preservation" 157 of existing wetlands as 
acceptable mitigation in very rare in-
stances. 158 
In general, EPA considers mitigation 
banking as an experimental conce~t 
which should not be widely used. 1 9 
EPA has also established several prereq-
uisites to the consideration of a wetlands 
mitigation bank. 160 Once the prerequi-
sites are met, the project satisfies the 
404(b)(I) guidelines, and all other im-
pacts are minimized, mitigation banking 
may be considered to reduce the remain-
ing unavoidable impacts below a level 
of significant degradation. 
The National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice (NMFS) also provided informal 
comments to the National Wetlands Pol-
icy Forum on its position on mitigation 
banking. NMFS expressed concern about 
the feasibility of mitigation banking and 
the affordability of obtaining land in the 
coastal zone for habitat improvement. 161 
NMFS also criticized current habitat 
credit/evaluation procedures, which it 
believes are overly complex and unreli-
able in estuarine or marine areas. 162 
NMFS agreed with EPA and USFWS 
that preservation is a mitigation tech-
nique used only in the rarest of occa-
sions. However, NMFS differs from the 
other federal resource agencies in view-
ing fees paid in exchange for banking 
credits as a new step in mitigation se-
quencing. 163 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
has generally not accepted the concept 
of mitigation banking, preferring instead 
to consider each permit request on its 
own merits. 164 In response to a North 
Carolina mitigation bank created by 
USFWS, the Nature Conservancy, and 
the North Carolina Department of Trans-
portation, the Corps bristled at the idea 
of granting habitat credits when it was 
not involved in the planning and design 
stages of the mitigation bank. The Corps 
has not produced any formal or informal 
guidelines on mitigation banking. 
The executive branch has been active 
in providing policy regarding mitigation 
banks. In August 1991, the Bush admin-
istration proposed to create an inter-
agency panel to rank the environmental 
value of various wetlands and to create 
"a market-oriented mitigation banking 
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system" to let developers obtain and 
trade credits for restoring and filling wet-
lands.165 At the time, then-President 
Bush stated that this proposal would 
"balance two important objectives: the 
protection, restoration, and creation of 
wetlands, and the need for sustained eco-
nomic growth and development." 166 
This statement is in direct contradiction 
to Mr. Bush's previous campaign state-
ments that "my position on wetlands is 
straightforward: all existing wetlands, no 
matter how small, should be pre-
served."167 
With a new presidential administra-
tion and at least forty bills currently 
pending before Congress regarding wet-
land issues, it is probable that a federal 
statutory scheme of mitigation banking 
will be -produced within the current con-
gressional session. Congress has already 
shown its interest in mitigation banking 
by passing the Surface Transportation 
Act, which includes a provision author-
izing funding for state transportation de-
partments to establish wetland mitigation 
banks. 168 Until a uniform federal policy 
is established, project applicants must 
discern and apply the policy of the par-
ticular agency or agencies reviewing 
their project. 
State Mitigation Banking Guide-
lines. To date, the only state guidelines 
for mitigation banking originate from the 
Department of Fish and Game. The 
guidelines are more specific-and much 
more optimistic-than those of any fed-
eral agency. DFG's Guidelines on Miti-
gation Banking (DFG Guidelines) were 
formulated in 1991 to "achieve a high 
degree of uniformity and consistency in 
the establishment of [mitigation] banks 
throughout the state."169 They are to be 
applied at all future wetland mitigation 
banks. 
The DFG Guidelines state that when-
ever possible, projects should be de-
signed so they do not impact wetlands. 
However, DFG notes that impact avoid-
ance is not always feasible, in which 
case impacts to wetland habitat must 
minimized. 
DFG also recognizes that onsite mit-
igation is at times either infeasible or un-
desirable from a biological perspec-
tive.170 Citing piecemeal urban develop-
ment as a cause of wetland loss and en-
croachment upon seasonal and perma-
nent wetlands, DFG supports regional 
planning prior to urban expansion so that 
wetland impacts are minimized. The 
Guidelines are not optimistic that wet-
land impacts can be eliminated in the fu-
ture and make no strong statement that 
such a policy should be instituted. 171 
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The Department's Wetland Resource 
Policy 172 requires that establishment of 
a mitigation bank must be accomplished 
through the conversion of an upland area 
to wetland habitat. 173 Conversion of up-
land area to wetland habitat is to be 
achieved by reconfiguring the area 
through excavation and/or construction 
of levies so that the area remains inun-
dated long enough to assume character-
istics of a wetland. 174 The precise char-
acter of a wetland present in a wetland 
mitigation bank is to be controlled 
through management practices applied to 
that area and, once established, wetland 
habitat values in the bank will be deter-
mined by a team of wetland experts. 175 
Once a mitigation bank is approved, 
the project proponents may mitigate the 
wetland impacts of their projects by pur-
chasing an appropriate number of miti-
gation credits from the owner of the 
bank. The guidelines define a mitigation 
credit as "a unit of measured area sup-
porting wetland habitat and wetland hab-
itat values not pre-existing at the bank 
site prior to bank development. Each 
such unit shall have been assigned a hab-
itat value by the DFG in consultation 
with other appropriate resource agen-
cies."176 
The DFG Guidelines require that 
banks be established near areas of ex-
pected future wetland impacts to ensure 
that those wetland resources being im-
pacted will benefit from bank establish-
ment. Wetland mitigation banks are 
therefore required to be created within 
40 miles of the impacted area. 177 Miti-
gation banks must also be sited in areas 
that minimize potential conflicts with 
present and future adjacent land uses. 
Under the Guidelines, wetland miti-
gation banks also may not result in the 
loss of upland habitat which is especially 
valuable to wildlife, and may not result 
in any uncompensated adverse impacts 
to existing wetlands. 178 
Wetland mitigation banks are also re-
quired to include buffer zones from 
which no wetland mitigation credits of 
any kind may accrue. The use of buffer 
zones is designed to minimize distur-
bance on the most sensitive s~ecies in-
habiting the wetland habitat. 17 
The DFG Guidelines also require that 
no uses of bank sites may reduce wet-
land acreage or habitat values onsite, and 
DFG will limit land uses adjacent to es-
tab Ii shed mitigation banks to those 
which are compatible with bank opera-
tions. In the alternative, DFG will seek 
the provision of expanded buffer zones 
and other mitigation actions to assure 
that future incompatible land uses will 
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not result in diminished habitat values. 180 
Perhaps most important, the DFG 
Guidelines set a minimum size of 50 
acres of newly created wetland habitat 
for wetland mitigation banks unless spe-
cial circumstances warrant otherwise. 181 
The DFG Guidelines promote the estab-
lishment of a few relatively large banks, 
rather than the development of many 
small banks. 182 
DFG does not always require mitiga-
tion to occur before credits are issued. 
Newly formed wetland mitigation banks 
which are planned but not yet im-
plemented may be used to offset project 
impacts with the prior approval of the 
DFG Director. These approvals must be 
obtained strictly on a case-by-case basis, 
and the ratio of mitigation credits to 
project-induced wetland losses must ex-
ceed one-to-one to ensure that no net 
loss of either wetland acreage or wetland 
habitat values results from the project. 183 
The DFG Guidelines require ade-
quate funding for operation and mainte-
nance of restored habitat in perpetuity, 
and require that title to privately-held 
mitigation bank lands shall be encum-
bered by a permanent conservation ease-
ment in favor of DFG or a nonprofit con-
servation organization. The DFG Guide-
lines also require that each mitigation 
bank be supplied with a guaranteed and 
permanent source of water of adequate 
quantity and quality to permanently sup-
port continual optimum wetland acreage 
and maximize wetland habitat values. 1114 
Only in the final paragraph of its 
Guidelines does DFG note that current 
technology is insufficient to ensure the 
duplication of the ecology of any type 
of wetland, and this language is limited 
to man's inability to duplicate vernal 
pools. Otherwise, the rather naive as-
sumption that wetland habitats may be 
recreated permeates the DFG Guidelines. 
Most mitigation banking in California 
has been limited to compensating the 
loss of deep water marine habitat 
through the creation of shallow subtidal 
estuarine areas. 185 DFG claims that this 
program possesses a high probability of 
success because of the relative ease of 
creating shallow subtidal habitat for 
nearshore fishes. However, there is con-
siderable disagreement as to whether 
mitigation of such subtidal habitats actu-
ally creates a working ecosystem. 186 The 
Guidelines state hopefully that "there 
does not appear to be any reason, how-
ever, why the same banking principles 
cannot be successfully employed to com-
pensate the loss of wetland habitat pro-
vided that the conditions for wetland 
mitigation bank establishment defined in 
10 
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these guidelines are implemented." 187 
This statement is troubling because DFG 
equates the relative ease of (apparently) 
duplicating fish habitat with the ability 
to reconstruct a complex wetland ecosys-
tem. The available evidence points in 
precisely the opposite direction. 
POLICY ISSUES 
REGARDING MITIGATION BANKS 
Potential Benefits. The premise un-
derlying mitigation is protection of valu-
able natural resources. Therefore, by def-
inition, the habitat must be the primary 
beneficiary of a mitigation bank and 
these benefits should be the reason the 
bank project is undertaken. 
The habitat potentially benefits from 
banking because mitigation efforts are 
concentrated on creating expansive, 
quality wildlife habitat rather than frag-
mented, project-specific efforts. The di-
versity of species in an ecosystem is 
often correlated with the size of habitat 
area, and the larger the habitat area, the 
greater the potential for a self-sustaining 
ecosystem. Because banking provides a 
mechanism for regional planning and 
implementation of more general wetland 
protection policies, mitigation banks 
allow for the consolidation of mitigation 
from small wetland losses. 188 This is im-
portant for several reasons. It provides a 
fine mesh sieve to catch wetland losses 
resulting from numerous piecemeal deci-
sions which individually account for 
negligible wetland losses, but cumula-
tively represent some of the most signif-
icant wetland losses. 189 By satisfying the 
mitigation needs of a number of projects 
that are small in terms of impacted area, 
a larger and more environmentally valu-
able area may be restored and/or pre-
served in a more efficient manner than 
the several scattered sites. This will slow 
the current process of whittling away the 
wetland resource. 190 
Perhaps the most significant benefit 
of mitigation banking is an enhanced 
ability to predict success of compensa-
tion when the mitigation action is initi-
ated. Most mitigation bank MOUs re-
quire that the mitigation be done in ad-
vance of the impacts and that the resto-
ration be considered successful prior to 
project approval. Thus, mitigation bank-
ing theoretically provides the opportu-
nity to assess the success of a mitigation 
project prior to agencies "signing off' on 
the project. Through the terms specified 
in an MOU, adjustments can be made in 
the restoration actions so that specific 
objectives may be achieved. 191 
If resource agencies stringently ad-
here to this requirement, mitigation 
banking could result either in an accel-
eration of wetland restoration technology 
because of the increased demand for suc-
cessful projects, or-if early efforts 
prove unsuccessful-the mitigation-in-
advance requirement could become a 
significant deterrent to projects with wet-
land impacts. 192 
Mitigation banking can also benefit 
participating businesses through reduced 
mitigation costs. Instead of each devel-
oper fronting the costs of mitigation de-
sign, permitting, construction, and mon-
itoring, these expenses are pooled, re-
ducing threshold costs. Mitigation bank-
ing relieves project proponents of the 
need to individually locate mitigation 
sites to compensate for their wetland im-
pacts and create or restore the required 
wetland acreage. 193 Specialization and 
economies of scale can reduce the per 
unit cost of mitigation. Moreover, miti-
gation requirements are better defined up 
front, avoiding costly delays during con-
struction. 
The entrepreneur restoration business 
benefits through the creation of a new 
market for proactive habitat restoration 
and preservation efforts. In addition, 
some businesses have found that the best 
return on their investment in non-devel-
opable land may be to sell the land for 
use as a mitigation site. Alternatively, 
they may donate the land to a nature con-
servancy for banking purposes, obtaining 
a valuable tax break and public relations 
bonus. 
In addition, the mitigation bank may 
provide an opportunity to consolidate the 
financial and management resources of a 
number of different entities, supporting 
mitigation projects that would not be fea-
sible for a single permit applicant. 194 For 
example, in the Tijuana River Valley in 
south San Diego County, a major tidal 
restoration plan has been designed to en-
hance hundreds of acres of sensitive salt 
marsh habitat. The price tag on the entire 
project will likely exceed $30 million, an 
amount that is unlikely to come from any 
single funding source. 195 
Mitigation banking also streamlines 
the regulatory process by bringing the 
necessary agencies together at an early 
stage of the planning process, minimiz-
ing conflicts which can be costly and 
time-consuming down the road. This 
shift provides predictability and lowers 
the costs of the planning process. Be-
cause mitigation banking actions should 
be approved and implemented prior to 
permit actions taking place, conflicts 
such as misunderstandings, uncertainty 
of success, and delayed permit reviews 
are minimized. In addition, because 
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banking proposals often encourage or in-
corporate comprehensive planning ef-
forts, they may receive closer scrutiny 
than conventional mitigation plans, in-
creasing the quality of review and the 
quality of the project. 196 
Mitigation banking is also more effi-
cient for regulatory agencies. Resource 
agencies typically lack the personnel and 
funds to monitor compliance, and permit 
applicants often fail or neglect to imple-
ment mitigation requirements. 197 Instead 
of evaluating and monitoring scattered 
piecemeal mitigation projects, agencies 
could concentrate their efforts on fewer, 
more defined projects. The savings in 
staff time allows a more efficient alloca-
tion of regulatory resources. And be-
cause success may be required prior to 
granting mitigation credits, monitoring 
and evaluation are easier, more efficient, 
and better organized with the fewer, 
larger sites used in mitigation banks. In 
addition, the formal mitigation banking 
agreement (MOU) can be used as a legal 
commitment to establish responsibility 
for follow-up evaluation activities and 
for reaching parties after the mitigation 
credits are granted. 
Mitigation banking also increases the 
potential for offsetting agency costs as-
sociated with the bank development 
through the sale of mitigation credits. 
The California Coastal Conservancy has 
recommended a premium of I 0% of 
project costs to offset the sponsor's ad-
ministrative costs. Such a premium may 
be used to help fund some of the agen-
cies which must review mitigation bank 
plans. 198 
The consolidation of mitigation ef-
forts also limits the number of parties in-
volved in the restoration or creation of 
habitat. With fewer opportunities avail-
able to restore larger wetland areas and 
a high demand for restoration and cre-
ation services, the consolidation of mit-
igation should provide a competitive ad-
vantage to those who can successfully 
create or restore habitats. Thus, the sci-
ence and technology of wetland restora-
tion and creation should improve with 
mitigation banking. 199 
Finally, wetland mitigation banking 
establishes a market price for habitat 
loss. Once the mitigation bank has been 
established and is deemed successful, the 
charge for mitigation credits may be set 
and resource agencies can give appli-
cants a ball-park figure on the cost of 
mitigation.200 At this point, the expense 
of mitigation may deter some applicants 
from proceeding with projects that im-
pact wetlands. Knowing the established 
price up front may also induce the permit 
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applicant to fund a more cost-effective 
project, or redesign the develo~ment 
project to lessen wetland impacts. DI 
Potential Hazards. As desirable as 
mitigation banking appears to be, the 
concept has its share of critics. One of 
the primary complaints from these critics 
is that most of the policy and technical 
issues raised by the typical mitigation 
project must also be resolved with regard 
to a mitigation bank. Moreover, since 
mitigation banks generally involve larger 
habitat areas, the risks associated with 
mitigation practices are magnified. Be-
cause it may take several years to eval-
uate the success of a mitigation bank, de-
sign flaws and poor decisions early in 
the process may lead to an unsuccessful 
project which fails to compensate for im-
pacts from several development projects 
which ,have already been built. The issue 
then becomes whether the bank sponsor 
will be required to invest additional 
funds for remedial efforts. The extensive 
planning and consultation process re-
quired in most mitigation bank agree-
ments theoretically lessens the likelihood 
of the problem of large-scale failures; 
however, several other hazards of miti-
gation banks are not as easily resolved. 
A summary of these problems follows. 
Mitigation banking raises the funda-
mental question whether it is possible or 
even desirable to attempt to recreate an 
ecosystem. In I 985, the EPA began a 
multi-level research program to examine 
scientific issues which result from wet-
land creation and restoration projects. 
The work resulted in a two-volume pub-
lication examining regional success in 
wetland creation and restoration projects 
and provided scientific commentary and 
policy outlays for future mitigation.202 
The EPA program concluded that dupli-
cation of naturally occurring wetlands is 
impossible, and that partial project fail-
ures are common.203 The ability to re-
store and create particular wetland func-
tions varies by the nature of that func-
tion. However, successful habitat created 
should reproduce all of the functional at-
tributes of a naturally occurring ecosys-
tem. Characteristics such as topography 
may be created with relative ease, while 
the creation of microbiological soil pro-
cessing may be exceedingly difficult. 
While structural characteristics may be 
attainable, functional characteristics are 
more difficult to assess and do not lend 
themselves to reliable predictions of suc-
cess in the planning stages. 
Another finding of the EPA study was 
that long-term success may be quite dif-
ferent from short-term success, and long-
term success often depends upon the 
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ability to assess, recreate, and manipu-
late the hydrology of the wetland sys-
tem .204 Other factors contributing to 
probability of success include the long-
term ability to manage, protect, and ma-
nipulate the wetlands and adjacent buffer 
zones, and the relative level of expertise 
in project design and supervision. The 
study emphasized that the establishment 
of the proper topography and hydrology 
alone will not assure success of a resto-
ration or creation project. Instead, con-
siderable energy must be spent in re-
planting, regrading, removal of exotics, 
periodic dredging, adoption of pollution 
controls for streams and drainage ditches 
running into the wetlands, construction 
of fences and other barriers to restrict in-
trusion by humans and domestic animals, 
and systematic monitoring and adjust-
ments in order to fill the gaps in scien-
tific knowledge.205 
The consensus reached by all review-
e~ of mitigation efforts across the coun-
try is that mitigation efforts cannot yet 
claim to have duplicated lost wetland 
functional values. Constructed or re-
stored wetlands do not yet maintain re-
gional biodiversity or recreate functional 
ecosystems and, while constructed wet-
lands may look like natural wetlands, 
few data are available to show that they 
behave like natural ones.206 Thus, the 
science of wetland restoration and cre-
ation-one of the most important prem-
ises upon which mitigation banking re-
lies-is also one of the most clearly un-
derachieved aspects of the mitigation 
process. 
A related criticism of mitigation and 
mitigation banking is the inability to es-
tablish universal objective criteria for 
measuring "success." Often blanket 
statements of success are provided by 
project progonents without data to verify 
the claim.2 7 Several assessment systems 
have been produced; however, their ef-
fectiveness in measuring habitat values 
and providing indicia of success over a 
broad array of habitat types has been 
questioned. For example, USFWS' hab-
itat evaluation procedures (HEP)208 have 
been criticized for the limited number of 
factors used in estimating success,209 
and has been considered by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers to be inapIJli-
cable to coastal wetland evaluations. 2 IO 
Other evaluation techniques have met 
with similar criticism.211 The establish-
ment of some consensus on the system 
or systems to be used in verifying the 
"success" of mitigation banks is an im-
mediate necessity if mitigation banks are 
to be compared and mitigation credits 
traded. 
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Mitigation efforts have historically 
focused on creating habitat for one or 
more target species, and have not main-
tained a larger focus on restoring habitat. 
As a result, mitigation criteria for assess-
ing success of past projects have empha-
sized the presence or absence of certain 
species, or a certain density of plants, to 
signify successful restoration efforts. 
These criteria simplify and skew the 
evaluation process in favor of finding 
regulatory compliance by measuring 
only a fraction of the components of the 
habitat. For example, projects measured 
solely by sufficient plant densities may 
resemble gardens more than natural hab-
itat; however, in terms of regulatory 
compliance, the project would be a "suc-
cess." Moreover, apfearances of success 
can be deceiving.2 Ecosystems are ex-
tremely complex and, in order to assess 
functional success in establishing a via-
ble ecosystem, all aspects of the restored 
habitat must be monitored and evaluated. 
Finally, even after the project has been 
evaluated for functional success, the hab-
itat values should be maintained over 
time-at least as long as the time the de-
stroyed habitat would have functioned. 
To illustrate an additional problem in 
assessing success, what happens when 
the mitigation bank is designed to create 
a certain type of habitat, but another type 
actually results? For example, if a proj-
ect is designed to create salt marsh hab-
itat on dredge spoils for the endangered 
light-footed clapper rail, but the vegeta-
tion fails to survive because the habitat 
elevation is too high, should the project 
proponent receive mitigation credit if 
other important birds use it as a nesting 
site (e.g., the endangered least tern)? The 
habitat that is unintentionally created is 
clearly valuable, but the end result is a 
net loss of one type of habitat with no 
measurable in-kind compensation. More-
over, is it proper to reward mitigation 
failures? On the other hand, the project 
proponent has invested a large sum of 
money in the attempted mitigation and 
would undoubtedly object to the imposi-
tion of new mitigation requirements, par-
ticularly if the development project has 
already been constructed. These types of 
evaluation issues must be resolved be-
fore a mitigation bank is created. 
Even assuming relative success in 
some types of habitat manipulation and 
an ability to evaluate and verify that suc-
cess, some ecosystems are more compli-
cated and more difficult to duplicate than 
others. Increased complexity generally 
translates into increased risks and costs 
for the project proponent(s). As a result, 
project proponents will favor creating or 
12 
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restoring habitats that are relatively sim-
ple to understand and recreate, and guar-
antee a greater likelihood of success. 
This situation becomes problematic 
when these restored habitats differ fun-
damentally from the habitat that is im-
pacted by the development project. 
When the mitigation bank is created by 
a private "restoration corporation" which 
creates or restores habitat for profit, 213 
the corporation will seek to restore that 
habitat on which it can maintain a decent 
profit margin. Logically, it will develop 
the easiest habitats to restore, and such 
habitats may become abundant at the ex-
pense of more complex habitats. 
In addition, the well-intended act of 
mitigation by habitat manipulation may 
actually have adverse effects on a natural 
habitat. Habitat manipulation necessarily 
disturbs an ecosystem by changing the 
physical characteristics of the environ-
ment.214 This practice encourages the 
proliferation of species which can toler-
ate disturbance (e.g., exotic species) and 
inhibits more sensitive, specialized spe-
cies. As a result, many mitigation pro-
jects fall short of projected biodiversity 
and are often colonized by the wrong 
species.215 Worse, further manipulation 
is not necessarily the remedy; once the 
habitat is colonized, it may take years to 
eradicate exotic or opportunistic spe-
cies.216 
The invasion of exotic plants and an-
imals is a serious problem in sensitive 
habitats everywhere, and the problem is 
potentially exacerbated by large mitiga-
tion projects which manipulate habitat 
near existing natural habitat. Unless 
proper controls are used, invasive spe-
cies will likely colonize a restored hab-
itat, and then spread to nearby natural 
habitat. The resulting degradation of the 
natural habitat is generally unaccounted 
for in the mitigation process and repre-
sents potential impacts from the act of 
mitigation itself. Such impacts would 
clearly reduce the number of available 
mitigation credits available in a bank 
system; however, it is unclear if such im-
pacts are ever considered when calculat-
ing mitigation credits. 
Critics of mitigation banking also 
fear that widespread use and acceptance 
of the concept will be interpreted as a 
relaxation of regulatory standards or, at 
the very least, a regulatory compromise, 
instead of a change in the method of im-
plementing those standards. These fears 
stem from at least two sources. First, 
mitigation banking combines the regula-
tory requirements of several potentially 
conflicting state and federal laws. Some 
of these regulations are considered "in-
ternally balanced," meaning that 
resource interests and development inter-
ests were balanced when the laws and 
regulations were drafted and no further 
balancing is necessary.217 Other statutes 
require a further balancing of these in-
terests on a case-by-base basis.218 By in-
tegrating the two applications, the inter-
nally balanced regulations may be bal-
anced against the development interest a 
second time, diluting the effectiveness of 
the regulation. 219 
A second basis for the fear of regu-
latory relaxation is an expectation of 
some interests that key factors in section 
404 permit processing will be relaxed 
where ambitious compensatory mitiga-
tion projects are proposed.220 The Foun-
dation for Environmental and Economic 
Progress has opined that adherence to re-
quiring avoidance of impacts before con-
sidering banking proposals could fatally 
defer meritorious mitigation banking 
projects.221 Such relaxation of standards, 
while not yet evident, remains an inher-
ent danger of mitigation banking. 
Conservation groups and regulatory 
agencies also fear that large-scale habitat 
loss may result due to "bounced checks" 
from ineffective mitigation bank efforts. 
This fear stems from the reality that mit-
igation banking currently brings with it 
substantial risks which can only be par-
tially resolved in the planning pro-
cess.222 Because the current status of the 
science of habitat creation and restora-
tion is uncertain, each project carries a 
risk of failure. "Bounced checks" are 
possible in light of likely political pres-
sures to allow the project proponent off 
the hook if it makes a good faith effort 
to comply with the agency's mitigation 
requirements. Forcing supplemental mit-
igation efforts on the project proponent 
would likely result in litigation and 
lengthy delays, at the expense of the hab-
itat. 
Finally, several key problems with 
mitigation banks are based on the eco-
nomics of the process. A key concern is 
whether the price of the mitigation cred-
its sold for a bank will equal, exceed, or 
fall short of the cost of creating or re-
storing the habitat.223 Estimating the cost 
of mitigation is almost as uncertain a 
venture as predicting probability of suc-
cess. The cost of mitigation for individ-
ual developers is already high. While 
mitigation banks will theoretically re-
duce costs, until mitigation banking has 
been tried and evaluated, the degree to 
which the concept will actually reduce 
costs to the developer is unclear. For ex-
ample, because a third party may be in-
volved in the bank (the restoration spe-
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cialist), this third party will want to be 
compensated for the risk of not being 
able to produce acceptable habitat. Some 
estimates of the overhead necessary to 
make a restoration specialist profitable in 
mitigation banking are upwards of five 
to six times upfront costs.224 
If the costs of a mitigation bank ex-
ceed the amount paid out by developer 
interests for mitigation credits, a new 
problem arises: Who gets stuck with the 
remainder of the costs? If the govern-
ment is forced to pick up the tab, then 
we have created an externality wherein 
the government (i.e., the taxpayer) is 
subsidizing the development interests. 225 
Public agencies such as the California 
Coastal Conservancy often sponsor mit-
igation banks and run the risk of not get-
ting reimbursed. However, if mitigation 
banking is to become a viable alternative 
in the permitting process, this risk must 
be assumed by the developers. 
CONCLUSION 
Mitigation banking is seen by many 
as an inevitable force in future California 
habitat management practices. The pres-
sures to develop sensitive resources and 
the scarcity of those resources over-
whelmingly favor some sort of regional, 
permanent wildlife management. How-
ever, in light of the significant flaws in 
the concept itself and in the available in-
formation regarding ecosystem reproduc-
tion, the immediate use of mitigation 
banking should be tempered. As EPA has 
noted, the concept is experimental, and 
should be treated cautiously. Moreover, 
as mitigation banking is implemented, 
each project should be used as a vehicle 
to improve upon the system and begin 
to eliminate some of the uncertainties 
and problems in implementation. 
Despite the recognized scientific un-
certainty in restoration ecology and the 
creation of functionally equivalent habi-
tats, resource agencies are reluctant to in-
clude experimental procedures in mitiga-
tion plans. According to EPA's Region 
IX Office of Wetlands Protection, EPA's 
primary concern is for mitigation on the 
basis of acreage and EPA does not ap-
prove of the inclusion of experimenta-
tion in a mitigation/restoration plan. This 
attitude promotes maintenance of the sta-
tus quo-scientific uncertainty-at a 
time when scientific advances are clearly 
needed. 
The rationale for EPA's position is 
understandable: With experimentation 
necessarily comes some uncertainty and, 
in any experiment, certain treatments 
will succeed better than others. When 
habitat values are at such a premium, it 
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is difficult to defend the use of mitiga-
tion requirements for experimentation. 
However, it is essential that mitigation 
practices begin not only to account for 
losses of habitat acreage, but also to pro-
mote the advancement of the science by 
setting aside enough resources to include 
experimentation in the mitigation 
plan.226 
Knowledge should be gained and the 
status of the science should be advanced 
at every possible point. Currently, there 
is no unified effort to gain any scientific 
knowledge from routine projects, and 
there is certainly no mechanism for as-
similating information learned in pro-
jects throughout the nation or state. Mit-
igation banking practices should be 
adapted to help resolve some of these 
problems. 
By incorporating scientific research 
programs into individual mitigation bank 
projects, the science of wetland restora-
tion can become an iterative process. 
Restoration and experimentation should 
occur in phases, with each successive 
phase using the knowledge gained from 
the previous phase to refine future miti-
gation design and techniques. Through 
this sequence, the problem of scientific 
uncertainty may slowly be resolved with 
minimum damage to the natural habitat. 
Integration of experimental treat-
ments into mitigation plans also makes 
sense from an economic standpoint. 
Classical economists may purport that 
scientific advancement and more suc-
cessful mitigation projects will evolve 
via the market system. That is, as pro-
jects become more efficient and effective 
at restoring habitat due to technological 
and scientific advances, the market sys-
tem will favor these projects and encour-
age further research and development of 
restoration techniques. Unfortunately, 
the market system in the wetland miti-
gation arena lacks several fundamental 
prerequisites. Not only is the market for 
restorable habitat extremely constrained, 
parties seeking restoration are also lim-
ited. These limitations mean the market 
system will work much too slowly to ad-
vance the science of restoration at a pace 
greater than habitat loss in California. 
As noted, the wetland resource in 
California is greatly depleted and dimin-
ishing on a daily basis. If the market sys-
tem is the only force encouraging scien-
tific advances in restoration ecology, the 
resource will be eliminated by the time 
the science advances to the point neces-
sary for successful functional replace-
ment (assuming that is possible). In other 
words, California simply does not have 
the luxury of relying solely on the mar-
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ket system to adjust the status of the sci-
ence of wetland mitigation; the resource 
is simply too scarce. Moreover, the per-
mit applicant should not be allowed to 
consider the partial expenditure of miti-
gation funds to further the science as 
compensation for lost habitat; rather, the 
cost of funding research is partial com-
pensation for the risks of failure in re-
storing the habitat values lost to devel-
opment.227 
To summarize, state and federal agen-
cies should agree to and implement a 
policy that will routinely assimilate ex-
perimentation into project designs, not at 
the expense of the resource but in addi-
tion to mitigation requirements. Parallel 
to these efforts, a data bank should be 
created to establish goals for scientific 
progress and to coordinate and dissemi-
nate information as it arrives. This means 
extensive consultation with scientific ex-
perts and an increased emphasis on the 
roles of universities in establishing a vi-
able statewide mitigation plan. Through 
the cooperation of private industry, pub-
lic agencies, and academic institutions, 
the science of wetland habitat creation 
and restoration, and mitigation banking, 
could have a bright future. If these insti-
tutions do not work together, the concept 
of mitigation banking may face early 
foreclosure. 
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San Francisco Bay Conservation and De-
velopment Commission). CAL. PuB. RES. 
CODE §§ 30000-30900. 
105. Address by Paul Webb, Califor-
nia Coastal Commission Regional Staff, 
Wetlands: Critical Land Use and Devel-
opment Issues in California (CLE Inter-
national Seminar}, in Los Angeles, Cal-
ifornia (June 13-14, 1991). 
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.; CAL. 
PUB. RES. CODE § 30330. 
107. LCP requirements are found in 
section 30500 et seq. of the California 
Public Resources Code. An LCP in-
cludes a land use plan and implementing 
ordinances, and must be certified by the 
Coastal Commission, whereupon author-
ity to enforce it transfers to the local 
government. This authority is subject to 
appeal to the Commission. As of January 
1992, a little over half of the 125 certi-
fiable local areas in the state had re-
ceived certification. 13:1 CAL. REG. L. 
REP. 112 (Winter 1993). 
108. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30500 
et seq. 
109. Id. at § 30233(a), (c); see also 
id. at § 30607.1. The criteria used in 
evaluating coastal development activities 
are set forth in §§ 30200-30265. 
110. The Coastal Act does not define 
the term "mitigation." The "common 
law" definition of mitigation refers to 
"methods of reducing potential damage 
or destruction to habitat, and ways to re-
pair, restore, or compensate for damage." 
Jon A. Kusler & Hazel Groman, Mitiga-
tion: An Introduction, 8(5) NAT'L WET-
LANDS NEWSLETTER (Envtl. L. Inst.) 2 
(Sept.-Oct. 1986). This impression of 
Coastal Commission mitigation policy is 
based on the author's review of a great 
many Coastal Commission project ap-
provals in which mitigation requirements 
are attached. 
11 l. CAL. WATER CODE§ 174 et seq. 
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1986). 
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1252; CAL. WATER 
CODE§ 13160. 
114. Water Resources Control 
Board, Division of Water Quality, Notice 
of Public Review of Proposed Negative 
Declaration for the Water Quality Certi-
fication of Nationwide Permits Issued by 
the U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers Pur-
suant to Section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act (November 1992). 
115. For example, in 1990 the Dis-
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ney Corporation approached the Coastal 
Commission, the Port of Los Angeles, 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
regarding a massive waterfront amuse-
ment park in Los Angeles Harbor. The 
project was met with a negative response 
from Coastal Commission staff and other 
resource agencies, and the Disney Cor-
poration was advised that it should not 
plan to proceed with the project. Never-
theless, Disney opted to continue with 
the project, apparently hoping that polit-
ical influence would save the day. See 
11 :3 CAL. REG. L. REP. 164-65 (Summer 
1991 ); l l: I CAL. REG. L. REP. 124 (Win-
ter 1991 ). In 199 l, the corporation con-
vinced state Senator Ken Maddy to carry 
a bill exempting the project from the 
Coastal Act, but strong environmental 
group pressure caused Maddy to drop 
the bill and Disney to abandon the pro-
posal in December 1991. 12:1 CAL. REG. 
L. REP. 158 (Winter 1992); 11 :4 CAL. 
REG. L. REP. 174 (Fall 1991). 
116. "Success" in these projects is 
determined by the presence or absence 
of the target species-the endangered 
Least Bell's Vireo. It is important to note 
that while these projects have generally 
been accepted as "successful," the cri-
teria for success did not include a mea-
surable, fully functioning ecosystem. 
117. For example, a riparian area in 
the Mission Trails Regional Park area 
east of San Diego was revegetated with 
willows and other native species to com-
pensate for nearby roadwork; these spe-
cies established themselves rapidly and 
appeared similar in value to surrounding 
habitat. However, biologists working on 
the project noted that the same or similar 
species probably would have revegetated 
the site naturally almost as quickly. The 
net effect of the project therefore appears 
to be acceleration of revegetation rather 
than increasing habitat values. 
118. Even where part of the habitat 
has been "restored" or "enhanced," the 
net effect is decline in total wetland hab-
itat. See Mitigation Problems, supra note 
2, at 33. Therein, biologist Zedler noted 
that "the assumption behind many miti-
gation projects is that native species can 
be concentrated in smaller areas by ma-
nipulating the habitat. This might be true 
for humans, but not for wildlife." By at-
tempting to crowd native populations 
into smaller and smaller areas ("high-rise 
wetlands"), long-term persistence of 
these species often fails. 
119. Determining the Need, supra 
note 53, at 11. 
120. This problem is not unique to 
mitigation projects in California or even 
in the United States. In Great Britain, the 
17 
feasibility of ecosystem creation has 
been questioned as often exacerbating 
problems rather than increasing resource 
values. See William Sutherland & Chris 
Gibson, Habitats to Order: Man Made 
Habitats Are No Substitute for the Real 
Thing, I 17 NEW SCIENTIST 70 ( 1988) 
(hereinafter "Habitats to Order"). 
121. See generally Pacific Estuarine 
Research Laboratory, A Manual for As-
sessing Restored and Natural Coastal 
Wetlands With Examples From Southern 
California (San Diego State University 
Biology Department 1990); I & 2 WET-
LAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE 
STATUS OF THE SCIENCE (Jon A. Kusler & 
Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989) (U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency EPN600/3-
89/038). 
122. Id. 
123. Jon A. Kusler & Hazel Gro-
man, Mitigation: An Introduction, 8(5) 
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1986). 
124. This analogy was first stated in 
Habitats to Order, supra note 120. 
125. See supra text accompanying 
notes 51-56. 
126. A mitigation bank differs from 
a mitigation project in that it is designed 
to compensate for habitat losses resulting 
from one or more development projects, 
not just one. Theoretically, a mitigation 
bank is always established in advance of 
the impacts that will result from the de-
velopment project. Elizabeth P. Riddle, 
Mitigation Banks: Unmitigated Disaster 
or Sound Investment? 3( I) CAL. WATER-
FRONT AGE (Cal. Coastal Conservancy) 
37 (1987) (hereinafter "Mitigation Banks"). 
127. USFWS is generally considered 
the primary authority on assessing im-
pacts to sensitive habitat areas. It is the 
only federal agency that has published 
guidelines for both mitigation (see supra 
text accompanying notes 51-56) and 
mitigation banking (see infra text ac-
companying notes 149-53). See also 
MITIGATION BANKING, supra note 43. 
128. FWS Mitigation Policy, supra 
note 51. See also MITIGATION BANKING, 
supra note 43, at I. 
129. See Diane M. Niedzialkowski 
& John A. Jaksch, Wetlands Mitigation 
Banking as an Innovative Approach to 
Wetlands Regulation in FRESHWATER 
WETLANDS AND WILDLIFE (U.S. Dep't of 
Energy, Office of Scientific and Techni-
cal Information, Oakridge, Tennessee) 
(R.R. Saritz & J.W. Gibbons eds. 1989) 
(hereinafter "Wetlands Mitigation Bank-
ing"). 
130. This general scheme has been 
used since 1985 when it was introduced 
by USFWS biologist David Soileau: 
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A developer undertakes mea-
sures to create, restore, or preserve 
fish and wildlife habitat in advance 
of an anticipated need for mitigation 
for project construction impacts. The 
benefits attributable to these mea-
sures are quantified, and the devel-
oper receives mitigation credits from 
the appropriate regulatory and/or 
planning agencies. These credits are 
placed in a mitigation bank account 
from which withdrawals can be 
made. When the developer proposes 
a project involving unavoidable 
losses of fish and wildlife resources, 
the losses (debits) are quantified 
using the method that was used to 
determine the credits, and a with-
drawal equal to that amount is de-
ducted (debited) from the bank. This 
can be repeated as long as mitigation 
credits remain available in the bank. 
David M. Soileau, Jim D. Brown & 
David W. Fruge, Mitigation Banking: A 
Mechanism for Compensating Unavoid-
able Fish and Wildlife Habitat Losses, 
50 TRANS. N.AM. WILDL. NAT. RES. 
CONF. 465-74 (1985). 
131. Mitigation Banks, supra note 
126, at 38. 
132. Telephone interview with Rob-
ert Radovich, Associate Fisheries Biolo-
gist, California Department of Fish and 
Game (Apr. 28, 1992). 
133. Mitigation Banks, supra note 
126, at 4. 
134. Id. 
135. MITIGATION BANKING, supra 
note 43, at 11. 
136. Id. at 11-12. 
137. In fact, no single habitat evalu-
ation system has been demonstrated to 
be successful in reliably measuring hab-
itat values. Id. at 14. 
138. For a critical analysis of the 
HEP procedure in coastal habitats, see 
David A. Nelson, Use of Habitat Evalu-
ation Procedures in Estuarine and 
Coastal Marine Habitats (U.S. Dep't of 
the Army E.L.-87-7, Wateiways Experi-
ment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi 
1987). 
139. For example, in the Batiquitos 
Lagoon enhancement project in San 
Diego County, the HEP analysis con-
tained a list of 30 target species of ani-
mals which were to be compared in a 
before-and-after analysis. The area im-
pacted by the project was a subtidal em-
bayment area in Los Angeles Harbor 
which was inhabited by nearshore fish 
species and nearshore bird species such 
as seagulls. The proposed mitigation site, 
Batiquitos Lagoon, is a shallow semi-
tidal brackish lagoon which provides 
largely shallow water, mudflat, and wet-
land habitat for shore birds, marsh birds, 
insects, and waterfowl. The indicator 
species in the HEP analysis consisted of 
28 species of fish and two groups of 
birds (seagulls and diving ducks). The 
effect of choosing these 30 types of an-
imals was to ensure that the habitat lost 
in Los Angeles Harbor would be evalu-
ated for replacement, but it ignored the 
existing habitat value of the lagoon. As 
a result, significant habitat loss would go 
unnoticed. 
140. See, e.g., MEC Analytical Sys-
tems, Inc., Evaluation of Habitats: Sec-
tion 9, Revised Batiquitos Lagoon En-
hancement Project (1990). A modified 
version of the HEP analysis, combined 
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' 
ratio to references (RTR) technique, was 
used, after the original HEP analysis was 
abandoned as inadequate. The Metropol-
itan Water District in Southern California 
has also recently developed a new 
method for use in a proposed mitigation 
bank involving impacts from reservoir 
construction. See Deborah Drezner, 
Diane Concannon & Jud Monroe, Miti-
gation Banking: A Quantitative and Eco-
logical Approach to Regional Site Selec-
tion and Habitat Quality Assessment, 
presented to the Association of Environ-
mental Professionals Annual Meeting, 
San Diego, California (Apr. 24-26, 
1992). 
141. The advantage of keeping land 
in private ownership for maintaining a 
local property tax base is somewhat tem-
pered by state laws providing for special 
reduced tax assessments for properties 
subject to conservation easements and 
other wildlife protection agreements. See 
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 422, 423.3, 
423.7. 
142. This is the pattern preferred by 
the California Department of Fish and 
Game; see infra text accompanying note 
184. 
143. Monitoring and maintenance 
differ slightly from value assessment in 
that a monitoring and maintenance pro-
gram is specific in the field procedures 
for collecting data regarding all aspects 
of the restored ecosystem (these include 
surveys of bird and animal use, soil pro-
cessing, vegetation, and other physical 
factors in the environment). By contrast, 
value assessment is the assimilation of 
the information collected in a monitoring 
and maintenance program and a deduc-
tion from that information the degree of 
success (i.e., the analysis and mathemat-
ical modeling of those data). 
144. The "filtering" process occurs 
in the sequential application of mitiga-
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tion goals; see supra text accompanying 
note 34. 
145. This includes the requirement 
that the development project must have 
no practicable alternative location or 
construction methods that would have 
less adverse consequences on the wet-
lands system while still accomplishing 
the project objectives. In the early 1980s, 
mitigation project proponents often tried 
to define their project so narrowly that 
there could be no alternative site or de-
sign. See GAO REPORT, supra note 71, at 
26. The USFWS and EPA no longer tol-
erate these strained definitions of "proj-
ect objectives." 
146. Some development interests 
have encouraged the relaxation of this 
requirement when large-scale restoration 
projects are proposed. This request has 
met with an emphatic denial from the 
resource agencies. 
147. MITIGATION BANKING, supra 
note 43, at 8. 
148. Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 
supra note 129, at 1089. 
149. Rolf J. Wallenstrom, Acting As-
sociate Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Interim Guidance on Mitigation 
Banking (ES Instruction Memorandum 
No. 80, June 23, 1983) (hereinafter 
"USFWS Interim Guidance"). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. See also MITIGATION BANK-
ING, supra note 43, at 8-9. 
152. The points which must be ad-
dressed in a mitigation banking proposal 
include the following: 
• All losses must be unavoidable and 
necessary. 
• All onsite mitigation alternatives 
must be pursued first. 
• Property must be available and sus-
ceptible to mitigation banking require-
ments. These requirements include an 
evaluation of the ability to acquire the 
site by easement, fee title, or other le-
gally binding agreement; ability to man-
age the property for increased habitat 
value; and ability to locate the bank 
within the same ecoregion, habitat type, 
and state boundary as the impacts being 
mitigated. 
• In-kind mitigation is required for 
Resource Category 2 and is the first pri-
ority for Categories 3 and 4. 
• Simple purchase of habitat is not 
mitigation banking unless "loss avoid-
ance" can be unquestionably demon-
strated. The extant habitat value of the 
mitigation site will not be considered a 
bank credit. 
• Consideration should be given to 
establishing an interagency team to eval-
uate sites and select suitable candidate 
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sites for the specific types of mitigation 
required. While developers may be con-
sidered as team members, they should 
not be in the position of having veto 
power or final approval of bank proce-
dures. 
• The interagency team could also 
"manage" the established bank by ap-
proving "credits" and "withdrawals." If 
the team approach is not used, it is sug-
gested that a third party (such as an or-
ganization primarily interested in public 
trust properties) be used as the "banker." 
• In no case will financial contribu-
tions to a trust fund for future land ac-
quisition and management be considered 
as a mitigation bank. 
• Means for long-term operation and 
maintenance shall be agreed upon before 
any area, facility, or improvement is ac-
cepted as a mitigation bank. For an ac-
tion to be considered as a mitigation 
bank or bank "component," there must 
be agreement among all parties involved 
that the action increases habitat value in 
excess of the value occurring naturally 
during the life of the bank. 
• Areas managed or authorized to be 
managed by USFWS shall not be con-
sidered susceptible to mitigation banking 
without specific approval by the Direc-
tor. 
USFWS Interim Guidance, supra 
note 149, at 3-4. 
153. MITIGATION BANKING, supra 
note 43, at 39-94. 
154. Michael L. Davis & Gregory E. 
Peck, Wetlands Mitigation Banking (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Of-
fice of Wetlands Protection 1991) (policy 
paper submitted to National Wetlands 
Policy Forum) (hereinafter "EPA Policy 
Paper"). 
155. Id. at 2. 
156. Uplands are areas of dry land 
adjacent to wetland areas. 
157. Developers will often offer to 
donate and/or dedicate property to be 
preserved as natural habitat in exchange 
for the destruction of nearby wetland 
habitat. EPA and USFWS discourage this 
type of exchange because, while it offers 
increased protection for some wetlands, 
it necessarily results in a net loss of wet-
land habitat. 
158. EPA Policy Paper, supra note 
154, at 2. 
159. The rationale for this conserva-
tive approach stems from concern over 
the following factors: potential misuse of 
compensatory mitigation to "buy down" 
environmental impacts of one alternative 
when another less damaging alternative 
exists; the technical uncertainties associ-
ated with creating and restoring wet-
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lands; potential misunderstandings when 
applicants construe or anticipate the es-
tablishment of a bank as implying ulti-
mate authorization of specific projects; 
the adequacy of habitat evaluation tech-
niques; administrative burdens of estab-
lishing a bank on the agency; the legal 
complexities associated with implement-
ing a banking agreement; and the need 
for long-term monitoring and mainte-
nance requirements. Id. at 2. 
160. These prerequisites, see id. at 3, 
are similar to those established by 
USFWS in its Interim Guidance; see 
supra note 152. 
161. Service Opinion Letter from 
Nancy Forster, Director, Office of Pro-
tected Resources, National Marine Fish-
eries Service, to Suzanne E. Schwartz, 
Director, Regulatory Activities Division, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(1991). 
162. Id. NMFS also notes that staff-
ing and funding of federal programs is 
insufficient to carry out protracted habi-
tat evaluation procedures, which may 
preclude attainment of no net loss goals 
in the near future. 
163. NMFS views money in lieu of 
compensation or restoration of habitat as 
a valuable method to augment budgets 
for expensive programs which otherwise 
might go unfunded, such as anadromous 
fish restoration. Id. 
164. See, e.g., Wetlands Bank May 
Not Mitigate Later Damage, ENGINEER-
ING NEWS-RECORD, Sept. 5, 1985, at 19. 
165. See, e.g., Wetlands: Bush De-
fends New Policy Against Critics, AM. 
POL. NETWORK GREENWIRE, Aug. 12, 
1991. 
166. Id. 
167. SPORTS AAELD, Oct. 1988, at 
15. 
168. Intermodal Surface Transporta-
tion Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991). 
169. California Department of Fish 
and Game, Guidelines for the Establish-
ment of Wetland Mitigation Banks ( 1991) 
at 3 (hereinafter "DFG Guidelines"). 
170. Id. at 2. 
171. Id. 
172. DFG Policy, supra note 97. 
This policy is separate from the DFG 
Guidelines on Mitigation Banking; how-
ever, the two policies are largely consis-
tent with each other regarding manage-
ment issues. 
173. This policy prohibits the con-
version of one wetland habitat type to 
another under the guise of mitigation of 
impacts from development elsewhere; 
however, this policy is not always fol-
lowed. See, e.g., note 139 regarding the 
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Batiquitos Lagoon Enhancement Project, 
in which wetland habitat will be partially 
used to mitigate for lost subtidal habitat. 
174. It is noteworthy that the DFG 
Guidelines do not require that the miti-
gated habitat be functionally equivalent 
to the wetland being lost; rather, the mit-
igated are need only assume the likeness 
of a wetland. 
175. DFG Guidelines, supra note 
169, at 2-3. 
176. Id. at 4. The federal guidelines 
do not elaborate on the meaning of "mit-
igation credits." This definition appears 
to discount existing wetland habitat 
value because it does not require a de-
duction for possible wetland habitats that 
are lost in the creation of the mitigation 
bank. 
I 77. Id. at 5. It is unclear exactly 
how the 40-mile limit was established, 
or what relevance it has to the ability to 
create in-kind compensation. 
178. Id. This requirement is particu-
larly puzzling, because most wetland 
species are at least partially dependent 
upon adjacent upland areas. Therefore, 
the upland habitat immediately adjacent 
to a wetland area is necessarily valuable 
to wildlife. This policy and the premise 
that all wetland mitigation banks must be 
created from uplands are contradictory. 
179. However, many mitigation pro-
jects use "buffer zones" for bike paths 
and other uses which severely disturb 
bird use. 
180. DFG Guidelines, supra note 
169, at 6. 
181. Such special circumstances 
may be approved only after review by 
the affected DFG regional office, DFG's 
Environmental Services Division, and 
DFG's Wildlife Management Division. 
182. DFG Guidelines, supra note 
169, at 6. Despite the policy to create 
large banks, some of the first California 
banks were less than ten acres. See, e.g., 
MITIGATION BANKING, supra note 43, at 
46 (summary of Bracut Wetland Mitiga-
tion Marsh Bank). 
183. DFG Guidelines, supra note 
169, at 7. This statement is wholly un-
realistic in that there is ample authority 
to show that even with a one-to-one mit-
igation ratio, lost habitat acreage and lost 
habitat values will result from project 
impacts. This clause will undoubtedly re-
sult in heavy lobbying of the DFG Di-
rector to approve banks with a one-to-
one mitigation ratio prior to the estab-
lishment of the wetland habitat. 
184. However, this requirement ig-
nores the ephemeral nature of many wet-
land areas in California. A permanent 
and constant source of water in many 
20 
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wetland areas would change their natural 
state. DFG should require further re-
search in this area and qualify this lan-
guage such that the timing of seasonal 
flows is added to the Guidelines. 
185. DFG Guidelines, supra note 
169, at 3. See, e.g., note 139 regarding 
the Batiquitos Lagoon Enhancement 
Project. 
186. Mark Fonseca, Regional Anal-
ysis of the Creation and Restoration of 
Seagrass Systems, I WETLAND CRE-
ATION AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS 
OF THE SCIENCE 175 (Jon A. Kuster & 
Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989) (U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency 
EPA/600/3-89/038). 
187. DFG Guidelines, supra note 
169, at 3. 
188. These include instances where 
impacts cannot be mitigated onsite yet 
are so small that offsite mitigation is un-
likely to be required. 
189. MITIGATION BANKING, supra 
note 43, at 2; see also Wetlands Mitiga-
tion Banking, supra note 129, at 1095. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. The mitigation-in-advance pol-
icy is a far different situation from his-
toric (and some current state) mitigation 
requirements, which were generally im-
posed by permit agencies and occurred 
concurrently with impacts, and some-
times subsequent to impacts. Because 
wetland restoration and creation projects 
often take several years to become fully 
functioning (if they ever do), there can 
be a considerable period of time during 
which habitat has been lost and the hab-
itat is dysfunctional; these temporal 
losses are often not considered in miti-
gation requirements. See MITIGATION 
BANKING, supra note 43, at 6. 
193. DFG Guidelines, supra note 
169, at 3. 
194. For example, homebuilders as-
sociations and construction coalitions 
may pool their funds to locate and pur-
chase property which may then be re-
stored for mitigation credit. In the Chi-
cago area, the Lake County Home Build-
ers Association and the Greater Chicago 
Home Builders Association have in-
vested over $40,000 to fund a site selec-
tion study as the first step in creating a 
wetland mitigation bank. Wetlands: A 
Swamp of Uncertainty, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 
25, 1991 (Real Estate) at I. 
195. Draft EIR/EIS, supra note 5. 
196. MITIGATION BANKING, supra 
note 43,. at 4. 
197. A weak link in the section 404 
permit process is noncompliance with 
mitigation requirements and lack of 
agency resources to monitor and evalu-
ate mitigation actions. Id. This problem 
is also prevalent at the state regulatory 
level. For example, the California 
Coastal Commission staff had only one 
enforcement position in 1991 to ensure 
compliance with mitigation requirements 
pursuant to the Coastal Act. 11 :2 CAL. 
REG. L. REP. 153 (Spring 1991). 
198. Alternatively, a major com-
plaint within the development industry is 
that mitigation requirements are already 
too expensive. The addition of a pre-
mium (10%), while extremely attractive, 
may serve the additional function of de-
terring plans to develop the wetland 
resource. 
199. MITIGATION BANKING, supra 
note 43, at 2. The science of habitat res-
toration also benefits. By requiring eval-
uation of mitigation efforts in advance 
of the impacts, banking creates an incen-
tive to refine restoration techniques and 
increase the probability for success. 
Where there is a required threshold for 
success, the enterprise is only lucrative 
if it is successful. Thus, the science of 
wetland restoration and creation should 
benefit from renewed efforts in research 
and development. 
200. Mitigation Banks, supra note 
126, at 3. 
201. Id. 
202. See generally I & 2 WETLAND 
CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE STA-
TUS OF THE SCIENCE (Jon A. Kuster & 
Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989) (U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency EPA/600/3-
89/038). 
203. Id. The reasons for partial or 
total failures differ; however, common 
problems include lack of basic scientific 
knowledge, inadequate design, lack of 
staff expertise and project supervision, 
invasion by exotic species, improper site 
conditions (e.g., hydrology, wave action, 
substrate, nutrient concentration, light 
availability, sedimentation rate, improper 
grade slopes), grazing by animals, de-
struction of vegetation or substrate by 
catastrophic events, failure of projects to 
be carried out as planned, and failure to 
protect projects from onsite and offsite 
impacts such as off-road vehicles, 




206. Joy B. Zedler & Milton Weller, 
Overview and Future Directions in I 
WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: 
THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE 465 (Jon 
A. Kusler & Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989) 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
EPA/600/3-89/038). 
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207. See, e.g., Corps Issues Permit 
for Solid Waste Resources Recovery 
Plant, BUSINESS WIRE, May 15, 1989. 
See also Port of Long Beach, Protecting 
the Environment ( 1991) (promotional 
pamphlet). 
208. See supra text accompanying 
notes 137-40. HEP uses mathematical 
modeling to estimate success, and relies 
on the assumption that habitat quality 
and quantity for selected species can be 
numerically expressed. DIVISION OF 
ECOLOGY, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SER-
VICE, HABITAT EVALUATION PROCEDURES 
(1980). 
209. HEP analysis limits the number 
of species evaluated to about 30. This 
limitation becomes a problem, especially 
when two types of habitats are being as-
sessed. See supra note 139. 
210. See David A. Nelson, Use of 
Habitat Evaluation Procedures in Estu-
arine and Coastal Marine Habitats (U.S. 
Dep't of the Army E.L.-87-7, Waterways 
Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Missis-
sippi 1987). 
211. See, e.g., Paul R. Adamus, Ellis 
J. Clairain, Jr., R. Daniel Smith & Rich-
ard E. Young, II Wetlands Evaluation 
Technique Methodology (prepared for 
the U.S. Dep't of the Army, Corps of En-
gineers, and the U.S. Dep't of Transpor-
tation 1987). More recently, an adapta-
tion of several procedures has been pro-
duced. Deborah Drezner, Diane Con-
cannon & Jud Monroe, Mitigation Bank-
ing: A Quantitative and Ecological Ap-
proach to Regional Site Selection and 
Habitat Quality Assessment, presented to 
the Association of Environmental Profes-
sionals Annual Meeting, San Diego, Cal-
ifornia (Apr. 24-26, 1992). This procedure 
was accepted for the project for which it 
was created; however, it has been rejected 
for widespread use by the California De-
partment of Fish and Game. 
212. For example, at the Chula Vista 
Wildlife Preserve in south San Diego 
Bay, two extensive dredge spoil areas 
were partially planted with cordgrass to 
establish intertidal salt marsh and 
mudflat habitat in compensation for the 
impacts from the creation of a marina. 
The site was monitored with photo-
graphs for three years and, by all visual 
accounts, the vegetation appeared to 
have established a healthy cordgrass 
marsh and the marsh was considered a 
success. However, in the fourth year, 
scale insects infested the cordgrass and 
the quality of the habitat rapidly de-
clined. As it turned out, the scale insect 
is a common inhabitant of salt marshes, 
but is normally kept in check by preda-
tory beetles. This particular "restored" 
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salt marsh was virtually devoid of the 
predatory beetle, which allowed the scale 
insect to proliferate uncontrolled. Sam-
pling of the insect community of the salt 
marsh as part of the criteria for success 
may have alerted project personnel that 
there was a problem, and the beetle 
could have been introduced to the marsh 
to combat the scale insect. Ultimately, 
the habitat was identified as a "success" 
when in fact it lacks substantial compo-
nents to the ecosystem. 
213. The establishment of a new in-
dustry of "restoration corporations" was 
envisioned by the Bush administration. 
The new restoration corporation will de-
velop a commodity (restored habitat 
area) and create a market for it (with mit-
igation credits sold for profit). This new 
industry has already begun to develop. 
See, e.g., Wetlands Proposal Disputed-
Biringer Farm Would Be 'Bank' to Mit-
igate for Filling Other Sites, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Jul. 22, 1991, at E3; From Straw-
berries to Salt Marsh-Wetlands Bank 
Idea Worth Serious Study, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Jul. 19, 1991, at AIO. 
214. In ecological terms, "distur-
bance" refers to random and localized 
changes to the physical characteristics of 
an ecosystem. When kept at a low fre-
quency of occurrence, disturbance actu-
ally helps increase biodiversity by pro-
viding windows of opportunity for new 
species to colonize. However, when dis-
turbance is large-scale, drastic, and/or 
chronic, only species which can colonize 
and grow quickly can survive. R.E. 
RICKLEFS, THE ECONOMY OF NATURE 
415-16 (2d ed. 1983). The disturbance 
associated with major mitigation projects 
includes wholesale manipulation of the 
habitat, such as changing the hydrology 
of a wetland, disking a road to overturn 
the soil, etc., which is potentially harm-
ful enough to limit biodiversity. 
215. See, e.g., Habitats to Order, 
supra note 120. 
216. Id. For an excellent discussion 
of this "planet of the weeds" concept, see 
David Quammen, Dirty Word, Clean 
Place, XVI(8) OUTSIDE MAGAZINE 25 
(August 1991). 
217. For example, the California 
Coastal Act of 1976 is considered to be 
"internally balanced" by the Coastal 
Commission. Address by Paul Webb, 
California Coastal Commission Regional 
Staff, Wetlands: Critical Land Use and 
Development Issues in California (CLE 
International Seminar), in Los Angeles, 
California (June 13-14, 1991 ). 
218. For example, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers has historically used 
a public interest balancing test in section 
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404 permit decisions. See supra text ac-
companying notes 57--61; see also The-
odore J. Griswold, Comment, Wetland 
Protection Under Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act: An Enforcement Para-
dox, 27: I SAN DIEGO L. REV, 139 
( 1990). 
219. Letter from Janice Goldman-
Carter and J. Scott Feierabend to David 
G. Davis, Director, Office of Wetlands 
Protection, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (Mar. 15, 1991) (regarding 
National Wildlife Federation position on 
mitigation banking in the section 404 
regulatory program). 
220. Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., 
Comments on Behalf of the Foundation 
for Environmental and Economic Prog-
ress, Inc., Concerning Mitigation Bank-
ing in the Section 404 Regulatory Pro-
gram (Jan. 25, 1991) (submitted to Of-
fice of Wetlands Protection, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency). 
221. This argument was also stated 
by the National Wetlands Coalition in its 
Comments on Policy Considerations 
With Regard to Mitigation Banking 
(Feb. 4, 1991) (submitted to Office of 
Wetlands Protection, U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency). The Coalition also 
argued against requiring projects sited in 
wetlands to be "water-dependent." Id. 
222. Issues such as the scientific un-
certainty of success and the ability to at-
tract some of the species the habitat is 
designed to benefit cannot be resolved 
in the planning process. 
223. Dennis M. King, Avoiding An-
other Taxpayer Bailout, 14( I) NATL 
WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
11 (1992); see also Mitigation Banks, 
supra note 126, at 38. 
224. King, Avoiding Another Tax-
payer Bailout, 14(1) NATL WETLANDS 
NEWSLETTER (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11 (1992). 
225. It should be noted that unless 
the government recoups administrative 
costs from the bank operator, taxpayer 
dollars are also used to establish the 
bank when the real beneficiary is the pri-
vate sector interest deriving benefits 
from the development. Letter from Ja-
nice Goldman-Carter and J. Scott 
Feierabend to David G. Davis, Director, 
Office of Wetlands Protection, U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (Mar. 15, 
1991) (regarding National Wildlife Fed-
eration position on mitigation banking in 
the section 404 regulatory program). 
226. Most of the sources of knowl-
edge currently used in mitigation tech-
niques stem from controlled university 
research which must then be extrapo-
lated to larger, often very difficult, eco-
systems. 
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227. In any valuation of resources, 
if there is uncertainty in the cost of the 
resource, the market accounts for this 
uncertainty by adding a premium on the 
cost of the resource. This premium the-
oretically incorporates the cost of the un-
certainty into the price of the commod-
ity. By analogy, wetland restoration cre-
ation projects which are used for mitiga-
tion and which incorporate a design that 
has considerable uncertainty in it must 
incorporate such a premium in the price 
of the resource loss commensurate with 
the uncertainty. This premium should 
then be used to resolve that uncertainty. 
The premium can be in the form of ad-
ditional financial costs, or in the form of 
additional dedication of lands for exper-
imental purposes (which thereafter 
would be restored). 
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